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RADIO· AND· AERIAL 21
COMMISSION OF JURISTS TO CONSIDER AND REPORT UPON THE
REVISION OF THE. RULES OF WARFAR:&-GENERAL REPORT

The Conference on the Limitation of Armament at Washington
adopted at its sixth Plenary Session on the 4th February, 1922, a
resolution for the appointment of a Commission representing the
lTnited States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and
Japan to consider the following questions:(a) Do existing rules of international law adequately _cover
new method,s of attack or defence resulting from the
introduction or development, since The Hague Conference of 1907, of n ew agencies of warfare~
(b) If not so, what changes in the existing rules ought to be
adopted in consequence thereof as a part of the law of
nations~

The Commission was to report its conclusions to each of the
Po·wers represented in its membership.
The Resolution also provided that those Powers should thereupon
confer as to the acceptance of the report and the course to be followed to secure the consideration of its recommendations by the
other civilised Powers.
By a second resolution adopted at the same session it was agreed
to exclude from the jurisdiction of the Commission the rules or
declaration_s relating to submarines and to the use of noxious gases
and chemicals already adopted by the Powers in the said Conference.
21 The St. Petersburg International Telegraph Convention ot 1875, to which the United
States never became a party, forms the basis of much subsequent negotiation on tele·
graph communication. A preliminary conference on wireless telegraph was held in
1903, and an international convention was drawn up in 1906. The Radiotelegraph
Convention of 1912, ratified by the United States, elaborated earlier conventions.
While this convention was negotiated between "The United States of America and the
P o-ssessions of the United State'Si of America," the ratification by the United States
included the possessions, "Alaska,. Hawaii, and other Possessions in Polynesia, the Philippine Islands, Porto· Rico, and the American Possessions in the Antilles, the Panama
Canal Zone."
The World War emphasized the need for further regulations, as by Article 21 of the
Convention of 1912 naval and military installations were not cover ed. :Many national
regulations were published during the hostilities, and various degrees of control over
radio were exercised by neutrals and belligerents.
The Conference on the Limitation of Armament by resolution Yoted in 1922 for the
a ppointment of a commission of jurists who should consider new agencies of warfare,
a nd radio was named as one of these. In earlier conferences, the terms " wireless
telegraphy ,'' "radio telegraphy," and others had been used, but the term "radio" wa~
a dopted by the commission as the comprehensive term for radio telegraphy, telephony,
and goniometry.

96

RULES FOR CONTROL OF RADIO IN WAR.

97

With the unanimous concurrence of the Powers mentioned in
the first of the above resolutions an invitation to participate in the
\vork of the Commission was extended to and accepted by the Netherlands Government. It was also agreed that the program1ne of the
Commission should be limited to the preparation of rules relating
to aerial warfare, and to rules relating to the use of radio in time of
war.
The United State.s G<;>vernment proposed that the Commission
should meet on the 11th !?~9emb~J-_92~, at The Hague, and the
representatives of the six Powers mentioned above assembled on
that date in the Palace of Peac2. At the second meeting of the Commission the Honourable John Bassett Moore, First Delegate of the
United States, ·was elected President of the Commission.
The Commission has prepared a set of rules for the control of
radio in time of w·ar, which are contained in Part I of this Report,
and a set of rules for aerial warfare, which are contained in Part
II of this Report.
The Commission desires to add that it believes that if these sets
<>f rules are approved and brought into force, it will be found
expedient to make provision :for their re-examination after a relatively brief term of years to see whether any revision is necessary.
PART I. RULES FOR THE CONTROL OF IL:\ DIO IN TIME
OF WAR
The regulation of the use of radio in time of war is not a new
question. Several international conventions already contain provisions on the subject, but the ever increasing development- of this
means of communication has rendered it necessary that the ·whole
matter should be reconsidered, with the object of completing and
co-ordinating existing texts. This is the more important in vie\v of
the fact that several of the existing international conventions have
n.ot beeR ratified by all the Powers.
The articles of the existing conventions which deal directly or
indirectly ·with radio-telegraphy in time of war are as follows:
The Land War Neutrality Convention (No. V of 1907) prohibits
in article 3 the erecting of radio stations by belligerents on neutral
territory and also the use by belligerents of any radio station established on neutral territory before the war for purely military purposes and not previously opened for the service of public messages.
Article 5 obliges the neutral Po-wer not to allow any such proceeding
by a belligerent.
Under article 8 a neutral Power is not bound to forbid or restrict
the employment on behalf of belligerents of radio stations belonging
to it or to companies or private individuals.
57920-26-8
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Under article 9 the neutral Power must apply to the belligerents
impartially the measures taken by it under article 8 and must enforce
them on private owners of radio stations.
Article 8 of the Convention for the Adaptation of the GenevaConvention to Maritime Warfare (No. X of 1907) provides that the
presence of a radio installation on board a hospital ship does not of
itself justify the withdrawal of the protection to which a hospital
ship is entitled so long as she does not commit acts harmful to the
enemy.
Under the Convention concerning Neutral Rights and Duties in
~1aritime Warfare (No. XIII of 1907) belligerents are forbidden, as
part of the general prohibition of the use of neutral ports and waters
as a base of naval operations, to erect radio stations therein, and
under article 25 a neutral Power is bound to exercise such supervision
as the means at its disposal permit to prevent any violation of thisprovision.
The unratified Declaration of London of 1909, which was signed
by the Powers represented in the Naval Conference as embodying
rules which corresponded in substance with the generally recognised
principles of international law, specified in articles 45 and 46 certain
acts in which the use of radio-telegraphy n1ight play an important
part as acts of unneutral service. Under article 40 a neutral vessel
was to be liable to condemnation if she was on a voyage specially
undertaken with a view to the transmission of intelligence in the
interest of the enemy. Under article 46 a neutral vessel ·was to be
condemned and receive the same treatment as would be applicable
to an enemy merchant vessel if she took a direct part in hostilities
or was at the time exclusively devoted to the transmission of intelligence in the interest of the enemy. It should be borne in mind
that by article 16 of the Rules for Aerial Warfare an aircraft is
deemed to be engaged in hostilities if in the interests of the enemy
she transmits intelligence in the course of her flight.
The following provisions have a bearing on the question of the
control of radio in time of war, though the conventions relate principally to radio in time of peace. These provisions are articles 8, 9
and 17 of the International Radio-Telegraphic Convention of London of 1912. Of these provisions article 8 stipulates that the working
of radio-telegraph stations shall be organised as far as possible in
such a manner as not to disturb the service of other radio stations ..
Article 9 deals with the priority and prompt treatment of calls of
distress. Article 17 renders applicable to radio-telegraphy certain
provisions of the International Telegraphic Convention of St. Petersbnrg of 1875. Among the provisions of the Convention of 1875 made
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applicable to radio-telegraphy is article 7, under which the High
Contracting Parties reserve to themselves the right to stop the transmission of any private telegram which appears to be dangerous to
the security of the State or contrary to the laws of the country, to
public order or to decency. Under article 8, each Government reserves to itself the power to interrupt, either totally or partially, the
system o£ the international telegraphs for an indefinite period if it
thinks necessary, provided that it immediately advises each of the
other contracting Governments.
Regard has also been given to tl?-e terms of the Convention for the
safety of life at sea, London, 1914.
With regard to the radio-telegraphy conventions applicable in
time of peace, it should be remembered that these have not been
re~vised since 1912, and that it is not unlikely that a conference may
before long be summoned for the purpose of effecting such revision.
The \vor k of the Commission in framing the following rules for
the control of radio in time of war has been facilitated by the preparation and submission to the Commission on behalf of the American
Delegation of a draft code of rules. This draft has been used as the
basis o:f its \vork by the Commission.
rrhe first article which has been adopted cannot be appreciated
\vithout reference to Article 8 of the Radio-Telegraphic Convention
o£ 1912. This latter article enunciates the broad principle that the
operation of radio stations must be, organised as far as possible in
such a manner as not to disturb the service of other stations of the
kind. The object of article 1 is to demonstrate that this principle is
equally to prevail in time of war. Needless to say, it is not to apply
as between radio stations of opposing belligerents. In the same way
as in time of peace the general principle cannot be applied absolutely,
so also in time of war it can only be observed "as far as possible."
ART1CLE

1

In time of war the working of radio stations shall continue to be organised,
as far as possible, in such manner as not to disturb the serYices of other radio
stations. This provision does not apply as between the radio station s of opposing belligerents.

Article 17 of the Radio-Telegraphic Convention of 1912 enables
States to regulate or prohibit the use of radio stations \vithin their
jurisdiction by rendering applicable to radio-telegraphy certain provisions of the International Telegraphic Convention of 1875. In
particular it is articles 7 and 8 of that Convention which enable such
measures of control or prohibition to be taken. The object of article
2 is to n1ake it clear that such rights subsist equally in time of \Yar.
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ARTICLE

2

Belligerent and neutral Powers n1ay regulate or prohibit the operation of
radio stations within their jurisdiction.

The next article is really only an adaptation of articles 3 and 5
of the Land Warfare Neutrality Convention (No. V of 1907).
Article 3 (b) of that Convention only prohibits the use of any radiotelegraphic installations established by belligerents before the war
on the territory of a neutral Power for purely military purposes.
The object of article 3 as now adopted is to prohibit any erection or
operation by a belligerent Power or its agents of radio stations
within neutral territory.
The wording shows that the responsibility of the neutral State
is affected as well as that of the belligerent State in the case in
question. The words " personnes a son service " in the French text
are employed in the same sense as the word " agents " in the English
text..
It should be understood that neutral Governments are bound to
use the means at their disposal to prevent the acts which the article
i~ designed to stop. This implies that they will be responsible in any
serious case of negligence.
ARTICLE

3

The erection or operation by a belligerent Power or its agents of radio
stations within neutral jurisdiction constitutes a violation of neutrality on
the part of such belligerent as well as on the part of the neutral Power which
permits the erection or operation of such stations.

Article 4 covers the same ground, so far as concerns rarlio, as that
provided for in articles 8 and 9 of Convention V of 1907 mentioned
above; but while article 8 stipulates that a neutral Po·wer is not
bound to forbid or restrict the use of wireless installations by a belligerent, and article 9 relates to the restrictive or preventive measures
taken by a neutral Power for this purpose, measures which must be
applied impartially to the belligerents, article 4 imposes on neutral
Powers the duty of preventing the transmission by radio of any
information destined for a belligerent concerning military forces or
military operations.
This article is a compromise. On one side one Delegation pointed
out that the 1907 system had stood the test during the ·war 'vhen
n eutral Governments had taken under article 9 of the 1907 Convention restrictive or preYentive measures which were quite satisfactory.
On the other side it 'vas pointed out that those measures had been
taken precisely for the purpose of com plying with the obligation
imposed by neutrality, and that it 'vould be 'veil to define this obligation so as to help and protect neutral Po"Ters in preYenting the
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Yiolation of their neutrality and thereby r educing the probability of
their becoming involved in the 'var. Agreement was reached on the
basis of a text indicating exactly the character of the n1essages prohibited, viz., messages concerning military forces and military
operations. It is understood that the prohibition would not cover the
repetition of ne,vs which has already become public.
It has been agreed that the article does not render necessary the
institution of a censorship in every neutral country in every vvar.
The character of the 'var and the situation of the neutral country
may render such measures unnecessary. It go~s 'vithout saying that
neutral Governments are bound to use the means at their disposal
to prevent the transmission of the information in question.
The second paragraph merely reproduces the first paragraph of
article 9 of the Convention of 1907. The phrase "destined for a
belligerent " covers all cases 'v here the information is intended to
reach the belligerent, and not 1nerely m essages 'v hich are addressed
to the belligerent.
ARTICLE

4

A neutral Power is not called upon to restrict or prohibit the use of radio
stations which are located -within its jurisdiction, except so far as may be
necessary to prevent the transn1ission of information destined for a belligerent
concerning military forces or military operations and except as prescribed by
article 5.
All restrictive or prohibitive measures taken by a neutral Power shall be
applied impartially by it to the belligerent::;.

The legislation of a large number of Po·wers, for instance, that of
the Powers represented in the Co1nmission, already provides for the
prohibition of the use of radio .installations on board vessels 'vithin
their jurisdiction. In harmony 'vith articles 5 and 25 o£ the Convention concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in :Th1aritime Warfare (No. XIII of 1907), article 5 enacts the continuance
of this regime in time of ·war and makes it obligatory for all mobile
radio stations.
ARTICLE

5

Belligerent mobile radio stations are bound within the jurisdiction of a
neutral State to abstain from all use of their radio apparatus. Neutral Gov~
ernments are bound to employ the means at their disposal to prevent such use.

The transmission of military intelligence for the benefit of a
belligerent constitutes an active participation in hostilities and there~
fore merchant vessels or private aircraft have no right to commit
such an act. If they do so they must be content to lose the i1n1nunity
which their· non-combatant status should confer.
The vessel or aircraft concerned renders itself liable to be fired
upon at the moment when the act is committed and is also liable to
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capture. In case of capture the vessel or aircraft will, if the facts
be established, be dealt with in the prize court on the same footing as
an enemy merchant vessel or· enemy private aircraft. Members o£
the cre'v and passengers, if implicated, are to be regarded as com~
mitting an act in violation of the la "\VS of "\var. A neutral vessel or
aircraft ·which has been fired upon without adequate justification 'vill
be entitled to address a demand for compensation to the co1npetent
.authorities. Jurisdiction over such claims might with advantage be
,conferred upon the prize court.
The second paragraph of the article places neutral 1nerchant
v essels or neutral aircraft when on or over· the high seas in a position "\V hich corresponds to that laid down by article 4 for radio
stations in neutral territory. Such radio stations on land must not
transmit information destined for a belligerent concerning 1nilitary
forces or military operations and the neutral Power must see to it
that this rule is observed. Mobile radio stations when on or over
the high seas are not subject to the control of the neutral Government to the same extent as radio stations on land, and consequently
the rule laid down in this article does not impose any obligations
on the neutral Government. The neutral mobile radio stations themselves will, however, be subject to the same measure of prohibition
as the radio stations in neutral territory. They must not transmit
information of the nature specified which is destined for the
belligerent.
The distinction between the acts dealt with in the first and second
paragraphs is that in the first and graver case it is assumed that the
merchant vessel or aircraft will have been acting in connivance with
the enemy. In flagrant cases, as for instance, where the vessel or air·craft is found transmitting intelligence as to the movement or
strength of military forces to an enemy in order to enable the latter
to shape his movements accordingly, such connivance would be
presumed.
The phrase " destined for a belligerent " has the same meaning as
in article 4. As in the case of article 4, it is understood that the
prohibition would not cover the repetition of news which has already
become public.
The collection by the belligerent of the necessary proofs to establish his case against an aircraft or a vessel may take time. The
examination of the message logs of many other vessels or· aircraft
may be necessary before responsibility can be fixed upon the particular vessel or aircraft which transmitted the incriminating
message. It is therefore not possible to limit the right of capture to
the duration of the voyage or flight during which the 1nessage was
sent. How long the liability to capture should subsist was a more

RADIO ON AIRCRAFT

103

difficult point to determine. Agree1nent was ultimately reached on
a basis of one year·.
It is realised that the risk of capture during this period will be a
great prejudice to neutrals, but on the other hand the injury done
to the belligerent by the transmission by radio of improper messages
may under modern conditions of warfare be irreparable, and therefore the sanctions attached to the rule must be serious. The neutral
will, hovvever, not be gravely inconvenienced by the measures necessary to protect himself against any violation of the rule.
In the case of all aircraft and of merchant vessels 'vhich are not
ca~rying_p~§&~n.g~!:§l, n~ great injury wiV result £roll! the prohibition
of radw messages other than those which are authorized by article 9, __
and in the case of merchant vessels carrying passengers, there can
be no insuperable difficulty in the institution on board the merchant
vessel, if it is thought necessary, of the same measures as the neutral
State may institute on land to protect itself under article 3.
Paragraph 3 is limited to neutral vessels and aircraft because
enemy vessels and aircraft are liable to capture at any time by
reason of their enemy status.
It goes without saying that as capture is a belligerent right it
cannot be exercised except in time of war, and therefore if the war
terminates before the expiration of the time limit, the liability to
capture is at an end.
The Netherlands Delegation has made a reserve on the subject
of· this article. It feels that the difficulties of obtaining satisfactory
proofs against a neutral vessel or aircraft in the prize court will be
so great in these cases that provision should be made for the international review of prize court decisions under this article. In its
opinion the Permanent Court of International Justice would be the
most appropriate tribunal for this purpose.
ARTICLE

6

1. The transmission by radio by a vessel or an aircraft, whether enemy or
neutral, when on or over the high seas of military intelligence for the immediate use of a belligerent is to be deemed a hostile act and will render the
vessel or aircraft liable to be fired upon.
2. A neutral vessel or neutral aircraft - which transmits when on or over
the high seas information destined for a belligerent concerning military operations or -military forces shall be liable to capture. The Prize Court may condemn the vessel or aircraft if it considers that the circumstances justify
condemnation.
3. Liability to capture of a neutral vessel or aircraft on account of the acts
referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) is not extinguished by the conclusion
of the voyage or flight on which the vessel or aircraft was engaged at the time,
but shall subsist for a period of one year after the act cmnplained of.
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Apart from the question of the acquisition by the enemy of information, the use of radip installations by merchant vessels or aircraft
may very well be a source of great embarrassment to the co1nmander
of a belligerent force. Not merely may it be essential to him to keep
secret the strength of his forces or the operations in w~1ich they are
engaged; but it may be necessary to ensure that there shoul¢1. be no
interference with his comunications. Further provisions are, therefore, required to complete the protection afforded to belligerents
by article 6.
For this purpose power is given to a belligerent commander to
'varn off neutral vessels and neutral aircraft and to oblige them to
alter their course so that they will not approach the scene of the
operations of the armed forces.
A second right given to a belligerent commander is to impose on
neutral vessels and aircraft ~er~ of ~Hence in the use of their
transmitting appp,ratus vvhen in the immediate vicinity of the forces
under his command. No matter 'v hat technical measures may be
taken by neutral mobile stations in accordance with the provisions
· of article 1, their messages, if made at a short distance from the
receiving apparatus of belligerent forces, might interfere with the
working of such apparatus, and such interference might prevent the
hearing of messages to or from the commanding officer or the other
units under his command.
To avoid undue hardship to neutrals, the f!l£.l.!!ty con ~d upon
the belligerent commander is limited to the duratioJ! q_tJ;he operations in~ic~ he is e~ged at the time. 1The article presupposes the
aetna! presence of naval or aerial forces engaged in operations, and
that the measures will not be applicable to widely extended zones
or to zones in which no military action is taking place.
It is also understood that the change of course provided for in the
first paragraph of the article must not prevent a ship or an aircraft
from continuing its voyage and from reaching its port of destination.
The article is confined in terms to neutral vessels and aircraft
because the belligerent commanding officer requires no special provision to protect himself against the operations of enemy vessels and
enemy aircraft.
·
It will be noted that the terms in which the article is drafted as
well as those employed in articles 6 and 8 would cover neutral public
vessels or aircaft. This does not imply any intention to encroach
upon the rights of neutral States. It is assumed that no such neutral
public vessels or aircraft would attempt to interfere in any such
manner with the naval or aerial operations conducted by the forces
of a State engaged in war.
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7

In case a belligerent commanding officer considers that the success of the
operation in which he is engaged may be prejudiced by the presence of vessels
or aircraft equipped with radio installations in the immediate vicinity of his
armed forces or by the use of such installations therein, he may order neutral
vessels or neutral aircraft on or over the high seas:
1. To alter their course to such an extent as will be necessary to prevent
their approaching the armed forces operating under his command; or
2. ·Not to make use of their radio transmitting apparatus while in the immediate vicinity of such forces.
.
A neutral vessel or neutral aircraft, which does not conform to such direction of which it has had notice, exposes itself to the risk of being fired upon.
It will also be liable to capture, and may be condemned if the Prize Court con·
siders that the circumstances justify condemnation.

Article 8 was intended to a void, as far as possible, the eventuality
of one of the belligerents being able to find on board a neutral mobile·
radio station any texts of radio messages transmitted from the radio
stations of the belligerents and not destined for such neutral mobile
station.
Such radio messages might possess military importance, and the
neutral 'vould thus involuntarily assist one of the belligerents by
furnishing him with the means of becoming acquainted with such
radio messages.
The seizure of the texts, entailing as it 'viii the removal from the
official log of the pages on which the operator enters the messagestransmitted and received, together 'vith an indication of the hour
of such transmission and reception, has appeared to the Commission
to be a sufficient penalty in veiw of the fact that such a proceeding
would attract the attention of the administration to which the mobile
station belongs, and would show that the responsible persons in the
service of that station had not obeyed the provisions of the present
article.
Provision is only made for the mere removal by the belligerent of"
the relevant pages.
The origin o£ the radio messages received is shown by the indications at the beginning of the message or in the call-sign. Military
stations use the indications entered in the register of the International
Bureau at Berne, or else secret indications which do not appear in
that official regist~r. No written record should therefore be preserved of .radio-telegrams 'v hich are preceded either by the indications of a belligerent military station or by an unknown indication.
It is to be noted that the text of this article does not exclude the
application of sanctions directed against unneutral service, if it is.
proved that the breach of the provisions in question was committed
with an intention of rendering unneutral service.

4
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ARTICLE

8

Neutral ·)nobile radio stations shall refrain from keeping any record of radio
messages received from belligerent military radio stations, unless such Inessages are addressed to themselves.
Violation of this rule will justify the removal by the belligerent of the
records of such intercepted messages.

In the first paragraph of article 9 the Commission . was anxious to
indicate that belligerents who heard signals or messages of distress
must, when deciding whether or no they would respond to such
signals, take into account both their duties to humanity and their
military duties.
'The second paragraph is inspired solely by sentiments of humanity with a view to saving human life at sea. The text specifies
clearly that every mobile station finding itself in danger or perceiving an immediate danger for other mobile stations will have the
right, however it may be affected by other provisions of these rules,
to transmit messages in order to ask for help or to signal the
danger for navigation "\vhich it has perceived. By the words "messages which are indispensable to the safety of navigation," should
be understood only such messages as are immediately necessary for
preventing the collision, stranding or loss of ships or aircraft.
ARTICLE

9

Belligerents are under obligation to comply with the provisions of interna
tional conventions in regard to distress signals and distress messages so far
as their military operations permit.
Nothing in these rules shall be understood to relieve a belligerent from such
{)bligation or to prohibit the transmission of distress signals, distress messages
.a nd messages which are indispensable to the safety of navigation.

Article 10 is inserted to prevent the employme:q.t of signals and
messages of distress as ruses of war. It is justified by considerations
·of honour and humanity. Persons who violate the rule may be
punished.
ARTICLE

10

·T he perversion of radio distress signals and distress messages prescribed
by international conventions to other than their normal and legitimate pur-

poses constitutes a violation of the laws of war and renders the perpetrator
:personally responsible under international law.

'The purpose of article 11 is to show clearly that the question
1Yhether an act ·which involves a breach of these rules constitutes also
an act of espionage cannot be answered except by reference to the
rules .o f international law which determine what acts amount to
-espionage.
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11

Acts not otherwise constituting espionage are not espionage by reason of
their involying violation of these rules.

The purpose of article 12 is to define clearly the position of the
radio operator so :far as regards personal liability to punishment.
The 9perator works in his cabin where he executes the orders of those
above· him. Consequently it is right that he should incur no personal
responsibility merely because he has executed orders which he has
received in the discharge of his duties as radio operator. Liability
to punishment :for acts which contravene rules such as articles 9
.o r 10 falls on those who have given the orders :for such acts.
ARTICLE

12

Radio operators incur no personal responsibility from the mere fact of carrying out the orders which they receive in the performance of their duties as
'opera tors.

It has not been thought necessary to insert in the rules an article
defining the word "radio-station" or "station radio-telegraphique."
The phrase is used in both texts as covering radio-telegraphic stations, radio-telephonic stations, radio-goniometr~c stations and generally all stations which use Hertzian waves transmitted through air,
water or earth.
The Japanese Delegation submitted to the Commission the :following proposal:
The belligerent may take such measures as to render inoperative the coastal
radio stations in enemy jurisdiction, irrespective of their owners.

After examining and discussing this proposal, the Commission
came to the conclusion that it was not necessary to insert a special
article referring to the subject. It was of opinion that the texts of
other international conventions or the usages of war covered the
question in all its practical aspects and gave the right to take the
measures contemplated in the Japanese proposal.
·
The Land Warfare Regulations and the Naval Bombardment
Convention, 1907 (No. IX · of 1907), permit the bombardment of
-coastal radio stations by land or naval :forces. Article 24 of the rules
for aerial warfare enables similar measures to be taken by the air
forces against radio stations used :for military purposes. Furthermore article 53 of the Land W ar:fare Regulations authorises the seizure by a belligerent in occupation of enemy territory of coastal radio
stations, even if such stations belong to private individuals.
An interesting proposal was submitted by the Italian Delegation
for protecting the radio-telegraphic communi9ations of combatant
:foroos by the establishment around them of a kind of " zone o£
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silence." The Commission agreed that this idHa was already implied
in the text of article 7, and that it was consequently not necessary to
express it in a special article.
PART II. RULES OF AERIAL WARFARE
In the preparation of the code of rules of aerial warfare the Caulmission worked on the basis of a draft submitted by the American
Delegation. A similar draft, covering in general the same ground,
was submitted by the British Delegation. In the discnssion of thevarious articles adopted by the Commission the provisions containe<l
in each of these drafts were taken into consideration, as ·well as
amendments and proposals submitted by other Delegations.
CHAPTER

I.

APPLICABILITY: CLASSIFICATION AND REMARKS

No attempt has been made to formulate a definition of the tern1
" aircraft," nor to enumerate the various categorieb of machines.
which are covered by the term. A statement of the broad principle·
that the rules adopted apply to all types of aircraft has been thought.
sufficient, and article 1 has been framed for this purpose.
ARTICLE

1

The rules of aerial warfare apply to all aircraft, whether lighter or heavierthan air, irrespective of whether they are, or are not, capable of floating on
the water.

For States which are parties to the Air Navigation Convention of
1919, aircraft are divided by article 30 into two classes, State aircraft
and private aircraft, State aircraft being sub-divided into military
aircraft and aircraft exclusively employed in State service, such as.
posts, customs or police. The article also provides, however, that
State aircraft, other than military, customs and police aircraft, are
to be treated as private aircraft, and subject as such to all the provisions of that Convention. For practical purposes, therefore, States
which are parties to the Convention of 1919 divide aircraft in time of·
peace into three categories:
(a) Military aircraft.
(b) State aircraft employed for customs and police purposes.
( o) Private aircraft and such State aircraft as are employed
for purposes other than those enumerated in (b).
The Convention of 1919 has not yet become by any means:
universal, but it would be so inconvenient for States, which are·
parties to it, to come under different rules in time of war, that ac-·
count has been taken of the provisions of the Convention vvhen
framing the articles adopted by the Commission.
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It has also been necessary to take into account the fact that Italy
has entrusted the super·vision of the customs service to the military
forces, a fact which has prevented the adoption of exactly the same
language as that employed in article 30 of the Convention of 1919.
When read in conjunction, however, 'vith article 5 below, it will be
found that the classification adopted by the code of rules of aerial
warfare corresponds very nearly with that pr·escribed in article 30
of the Convention mentioned above.
ARTICLE

2

The following shall be deemed to be public aircraft :
(a) l\filitary aircraft.
(b) Non-military aircraft exclusively employed in the public service.
All other aircraft shall be deemed to be private aircraft.

A clear distinction 1nust be n1ade bet,veen aircraft 'v hich form
part of the combatant forces in time of war and those 'vhich do not.
Each class must be easily recognisable; this is essential if the immunities to which non-combatant aircr·aft are entitled are to be
respected. Article 3 has been framed 'vith this object.
ARTICLE

3

A military aircraft shall bear an external n1ark indicating its nationality
and military character.

Public non-military aircraft are not in command of persons commissioned or enlisted in the fighting forces; consequently there must
be evidence on board the aircraft of the service in which they are
Bngaged. Such evidence is afforded by their papers. It will be seen
by reference to article 51 below that aircraft of this class n1ay be
visited for the purpose of the verification of their papers.
ARTICLE

4

A public non-military aircraft employed for customs or police purposes shall
carry papers evidencing the fact that it is exclusively employed in the public
service. Such an aircraft shall bear an external mark indicating its nationality
and its public non-military character.

Article 5 has been adopted for the purpose of regulating the
position of State-o,vned aircraft employed in the postal service, or
for com1nercial purposes. Such aircraft will be engaged in international traffic which should properly subject then1 to the same
1neasures of control as those to ·which private aircraft are subject.
They should also bear the same marks.
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In terms the article applies to all public non-military aircraft.
other than those employed for customs or police purposes, following
in this respect the language adopted in the last paragr·aph of article
30 of the Air Navigation Convention of 1919. It is in connection
with aircraft employed in the postal service or for commercial
purposes that it ·will find its chief application.
Objection has been expressed to this article by the Netherlands
Delegation on the ground that its effect will be to subject Stateowned aircraft to capture and to the jurisdiction of belligerent prize
courts.
ARTICLE

5

Public non-military aircraft other than those employed for customs or police_
purposes shall in time of war bear the same external marks, and for the purposes of these rules shall be treated on the same footing, as private aircraft.

Private aircraft must in time of war bear marks to indicate their
nationality and character and to enable the aircraft to be identified.
It would be inconvenient that the marks to be borne in war time
should differ from those borne in time of peace. For peace time the.
marks which a private aircraft is to bear are prescribed in the Air
Navigation Convention of 1919. This Convention, however, is not
uniYersal in character and account must be taken of the position of
States which are not parties to it. Nevertheless, all States, whether
parties to the Convention or not, will before long have enacted
legislation as to the marks which aircraft of that nationality are to
bear. The Commission has therefore felt that it will be sufficient to
lay down as the rule for time of war that aircraft must bear the mark~
which are prescribed by the legislation in force in their o'vn country~
Foreign Po,vers, whether belligerent or neutral, are not concerned
with the enforcement of that legislation as such; that is a matter for
the municipal courts of the country concerned. The object of the
article is to afford to belligerent and neutral authorities a guide as
tQ t~~ :marks ·which a privat~ a;i:rGr~ft ml!st l)e~r!
ARTICLE

6

.A.ircraft not comprised in articles 3 and 4 and deemed to be private aircraft
shall carry such papers and bear such external marks as are required by the
rules in force in their own country. These marks must indicate their nationality and character.

Great abuses might prevail if the external marks affixed to an
aircraft could be altered while the machine was in flight. It is also
necessary that the marks should be clearly visible. The principles
adopted in article 7 are in harmony with the provisions of the Air
Navigation Convention of 1919.

EXTERNAL MARKS
ARTICLE
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7

The external marks required by the above articles shall be so affixed that
they cannot be altered in flight. They shall be as large as is practicable and
shall be visible from above, from below, and from each side.

Each State chooses :for itself the marks which its aircraft are to
bear. The marks chosen for private aircraft in time of peace by
States which are parties to the Air Navigation Convention of 1919
are set out in that Convention, and are generally known. It is
equally important that the marks for public aircraft, ·whether military or non-military, should be equally -well known, and also tht
marks chosen for private aircraft possessing the nationality of a
State, which is not a party to the said Convention. Notification to
all other Powers is, therefore, provided for of the marks prescribed
by the rules in force in each State.
Necessity may arise for a change in the marks adopted by each
State. When that happens the change must be notified. If the
change is made in time of peace, there can be no difficulty in notifying it before it is brought into force.
In time of war changes must be notified as soon as possible and at
latest when they are communicated by the State concerned to its
own fighting forces. It will be important to a State, which changes
the marks on its military aircraft in time of war, to notify the change
as quickly as possible to its own forces, as otherwise the aircraft
might run the risk o:f being shot down by their own side. For this
reason no anxiety need be felt that there will be any attempt to
evade compliance with the rule.
Regret has been expressed in some quarters that any change
should be allowed in time of war of the marks adopted by a particular
State. The practical reasons, however, in favour of allowing such
modifications are overwhelming. The marks adopted by different
countries for their military machines are in some cases not _very dissimilar, and if war broke out between two countries whose military
machines bore marks which were not readily distinguishable, it
w·ould be essential that a modification should be made.
ARTICLE

8

The external marks, prescribed by the rules in force in each State, shall be:
notified pron1ptly to all other Powers.
Modifications adopted in time of peace of the rules prescribing external marks:
shall be notified to all other Powers before they are brought into force.
Modifications of such rules adopted at the outbreak of war or during hostilities shall be notified by each Power as soon as possible to all other Powers
and at latest when they are communicated to its own fightivg forces.

Article 9 is founded upon a proposal first submitted by the
Japanese Delegation; an American proposal to the same effect was_
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submitted at a later stage. The subject of the article is one of some
;difficulty and one ·which has in times past been fruitful of discussions
and disagreements in connection with warships, the Powers not
having been able to agree whether the act of sovereignty involved
in the commissioning of a warship might properly be exercised on
the high seas (see the preamble to Convention VII of 1907).
The proposal received the support of a majority of the delegations
only, the French Delegation being unable to accept it.
ARTICLE

9

A belligerent non-military aircraft, whether public or private, may be conv erted into a military aircraft, provided that the conversion is effected within
the jurisdiction of the belligerent State to which the aircraft belongs and not
·on the high seas.

The proposal submitted by the Japanese Delegation would also
have prevented the conversion of military aircraft into private_
aircraft except within the jurisdiction of the belligerent State concerned. The majority of the members of the Commission were of
opinion that an article on this subject was not required. It does
not seem likely that such conversion would be effected upon the
high seas except for the purpose of enabling an aircraft, not otherwise entitled to do so, to enter neutral territory. There would be
1nany practical difficulties in the way of any such conversion: not
only would identity marks have to be affixed which would depend
-on the registration in the home State, but a civilian crew would
have to be obtained and various certificates would be required, all
·of which should be dated. If the marks and papers belonging to
some other aircraft were used, the marks and papers would be false.
A fraud would have been practised on the neutral State. Even if
the proceedings were authorised by the belligerent State concerned,
so that it would be valid under its own law, the marks wou~d still
be false marks so far as concerned the neutral State, and if it became
aware of the fraud committed, it would be justified in disregarding
the conversion.
Article 10 adopts for time of war a principle which has already
been adopted for private aircraft in time of peace by article 8 of
the Air Navigation Convention of 1919.
ARTICLE

10

No aircraft may possess more than· one nationality.
CHAPTER

ii.

GENERAL PRINCiPLES

Article 11 embodies the general principle that outside the juris·d iction of any State, i. e., in the air space over the high seas, all air. craft have full freedom of passage. Provisions em bodied in other
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articles which restrict the liberty of individual aircraft are to be
regarded as exceptions to this general principle.
ARTICLE

11

Outside the jurisdiction of any State, belligerent or neutral, all aircraft
shall have full freedom of passage through the air and of alighting.

In time of peace many States are subject to treaty obligations
requiring them to allow airc~aft of other States to circulate in the·
air space above their territory. In time of war a State must possess
greater freedom of action. Article 12 therefo~e recognises the liberty
of each State to enact such rules on this subject as it may deem
necessary.
ARTICLE

12

In time of war any State, whether belligerent or neutral, may forbid or
regulate the entrance, movement or sojourn of aircraft within its jurisdiction ..
KNO,VLEDGE OF 'l'HE EXISTENCE OF THE 'V AR

Among the provisions contained in the original American draft
was an article to the following effect :
The liability of an aircraft for violation of the laws of war is contingent upon
her actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of the war.

The discussions upon this article led the American Delegation to·
withdraw the proposal.
l{nowledg~ of the existence of a state of war was frequently in
the past an important element in deciding cases instituted in prize
courts for the conde1nnation of a ship or goods. Sailing ships were
often at sea in old days for months without touching at any port, and
under such conditions it was easy for a vessel to be una ware of the·
outbreak of war. The question diminished in importance when
steamships tended to replace sailing ships, and diminished still morein importance when wireless telegraphy was invented and fitted to
sea-going ships.
vVith aircraft the case is different; the velocity of their flight and
the small suplies of fuel which they can carry will render it unusual
for a flight to exceed twelve hours in length. Cases are therefo~e not
likely to arise in which there can be any doubt of the actual knowledge of the existence of a state of 'var, or in which constructive
knowledge has to be relied on. Furthermore, all aircraft of important size are likely to be fitted with a wireless installation.
1"he Declaration of London, £rained in 1909, contained provisions.
on this subject (see articles 43 and 45), and it was then found
necessary to deal with the matter in greater detail than is attempted
in the above American proposal. Until experience shows that it isnecessary to fra1ne a rule on this subject for aircraft, it seems more·
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prudent to leave the matter to rest on the basis of the general rules
-of international law.
So far as concerns neutral Po,vers, the Convention on the Opening
of Hostilities (No. III of 1907) lays down that the existence o:f a
.state of war must be notified to neutral Powers, and that they are
·subject to no obligations arising therefrom until the receipt of such
notification. They cannot, however, rely on the absence o:f any such
notification, if it can be established that they were actually aware
o:f the existence of the state o:f war. This provision seems adequate
-and satisfactory.
CHAPTER III. BELLIGERENTS
The use o:f privateers in naval warfare 'vas abolished by the
Declaration o:f Paris, 1856. Belligerent rights at sea can now only
be exercised by units under the direct authority, immediate control
and responsibility o:f the State. This same principle should apply
to aerial warfare. Belligerent rights should therefore only be
~exercised by military aircraft.
ARTICLE

13

-Military aircraft are alone entitled to exercise belligerent rights.

Operations o:f war involve the responsibility o:f the State. Units
·o:f the fighting :forces must, therefore, be under the direct control o:f
persons responsible to the State. For the same reason the crew
must be exclusively military in order that they may be subject to
military discipline.
ARTICLE

14

A military aircraft shall be under the command of a person duly com.missioned or. enlisted in the military service of the State; the crew must be
-exclusively military.

Combatant members o:f the armed land :forces must, if they are
not in uniform, wear at least a distinctive emblem. So long as the
()fficers or crew o:f a military aircraft are on board the aircraft there is
no risk o:f any doubt as to their combatant status, but i:f they are
-forced to land they may become separated :from the machine. In
that event it is necessary :for their own protection that their combatant status should be easily recognised.
ARTICLE

15

Members of the crew of a military aircraft shall wear a fixed distinctive
'€mblem of such character as to be recognisable at a distance in case they be'Come separated from their aircraft.

The next article indicates the aircraft which may engage in
hostilities, and forbids private aircraft from being armed when they
.are outside the jurisdiction o:f their own country.
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The immunities which a belligerent is bound to respect in a non~ombatant impose upon the non-combatant a corresponding obligation not to take part in hostilities. This principle applies equally to
aerial warfare. If a distinction is to be drawn between military and
other aircraft, the distinction must be observed on both sides, and
non-military aircraft must not attempt to engage in hostilities in
any form.
To give full effect to this principle, a non-military aircraft must
be debarred from transmitting, during flight, military intelligencE
-for the benefit of a belligerent. This rule will be seen to be natural
·a nd logical i£ the peculiar characteristics of aircraft are borne in mind.
It is as scouts and observers that one of their principal uses is found
in time of war. If non-military aircraft were to be allowed to act in
this capacity, injury of very serious consequence 1night be done to
the opposing belligerent. If exposed to such risk, no belligerent
teould agree to respect the immunities which a non-combatant air'C raft should enjoy, and the only way to ensure such respect is to
recognise that the transmission of military intelligence for the benefit
;of a belligerent is a participation in hostilities, which would constitute
a violation of the laws of 'var and would be dealt with accordingly.
'The rule as framed has been restricted within the narro,vest limits
-compatible with military safety. It is limited to transmission of
intelligence during flight. When the flight has been completed, the
individual concerned will be within the jurisdiction of some State,
and there the control of the transmission of information will be
subject to the regulations of that State. It will not be affected by the
provisions of this article.
The mounting of arms in time of war may be construed as prima
facie evidence of an intention to take part in hostilities. It is true
that of recent years certain States found it necessary to arm merchant
ships in self-protection, but the conditions of air warfare are so
different that it has not been thought necessary to allow for such a
proceeding on the part of aircraft. A gun would not be an adequate
protection to an aircraft against illegal attack, as the first warning
the aircraft might have of any such attack would be an ·act which
might involve its destruction.
On the other hand, to permit private aircraft to be armed ·would
facilitate acts of perfidy on the part of an opposing belligerent; an
aircraft masquerading under false marks might suddenly open fire,
and the risk of this would be sufficient to render it dangerous for an
honest belligerent to respect t:qe immunities of private aircraft to the
extent which he would wish.
The interests of private aircraft are from every point of view
better served by the adoption of a rule against the arming of private
aircraft in time of war.
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The article as framed does not extend to aircraft within the jurisdiction of their own State. Such an extension would be an unreasonable interference with the domestic jurisdiction of the State
concerned.
The rule against aircraft being armed is limited to private aircraft. Public non-military aircraft engaged in customs or police
work may find it necessary to carry arms because the fulfillment of
their functions renders it essential for them to be able to apply
coercion in case of need. In their case, the carriage of arms 'vould
raise no presumption of an intention to take part in hostilities, but
they are subject just as much as private aircraft to the provisions of
the first two paragraphs of the article.
ARTICLE

16

No aircraft other than a belligerent military aircraft shall engage in hostilities in any form.
The term "hostilities'' includes the transn1ission during flight of Inilitary
intelligence for the im1nediate use of a belligerent.
No private aircraft, when outside the jurisdiction of its own country, shall
be armed in time of war.

The provisions of the Geneva Convention have been applied to
1naritime warfare by the Convention signed at The Hague in 1907
(Convention X of 1907). It will probably be found desirable to extend them in due course to warfare in the air and to negotiate a special convention for this purpose. Pending the conclusion of any
such convention, a rule has been adopted stating broadly that these
conventions apply to aerial warfare. Flying ambulances should enjoy the privileges and immunities conferred by the Geneva Convention upon mobile medical units or sanitary formations. The work of
such flying ambulances must, of course, be carried out subject to
similar conditions of belligerent control as those laid down in the
Conventions of 1906 and 1907, and they must devote themselves
to the task of succouring all wounded impartially in accordance with
the principles,. embodied in these Conventions. When the new
special convention referred to above is concluded, the opportunity
will no doubt be taken to extend to flying ambulances the exemption
from dues already conferred by treaty upon hospital ships which
enter a foreign port.
ARTICLE

17

The principles laid clown in the Geneva Convention, 1906, and the Convention for the adaptation of the said Convention to Maritime "'\Var (No. X of
1907) shall apply to aerial warfare and to flying ambulances, as well as to the
control over flying an1bnlances exercised by a belligerent commanding officer.
In order to enjoy the protection and privileges allowe<l to mobile medical
units by the Geneva Convention, 1906, flying ambulances must bear the distinctive emblem of the Red Cross in addition to the usual distinguishing marks.

CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES
CHAPTER

IV.
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Article 18 is intended to clear up a doubt which arose during the
recent war. The use of tracer bullets against aircraft 'vas a general
practice in all the contending armies. In the absence of a hard
surface on which the bullet will strike, an airman cannot tell whether
or not his aim is correct. These bullets were used for the purpose
of enabling the airman to correct his aim, as the trail of vapour which
they leave behind indicates to him the exact line of fire. In one
case, however, combatant airmen were arrested and put on trial on
the ground that the use of these bullets constituted a breach of the
existing rules of war laid down by treaty.
The use of incendiary bullets is also necessary as a means of
.-attack against lighter-than-air craft, as it is by setting fire to the
gas contained by these aircraft that they can most easily be destroyed.
In the form in which the proposal was first brought forward its
provisions were limited to a stipulation that the use of tracer bullets
.against aircraft generally was not prohibited.
Various criticisms were, however, made about the proposed text,
chiefly founded on the impracticability for an airman while in flight
to change the ammunition which he is using in the machine gun in
his aircraft. He cannot employ different bullets in accordance with
the target at which he is aiming, one sort of ammunition for other
:aircraft and another sort for land forces by whom he may be
:attacked.
The Commission, therefore, came to the conclusion that the most
·satisfactory solution of the problem -w ould be to state specifically
that the use of tracer, incendiary or explosive projeotiles by or
:against aircraft is not prohibited.
ARTICLE

18

The use of tracer, incendiary or explosive projectiles by or against aircraft is
not prohibited.
This provision applies equally to States which are parties to the Declaration
.of St. Petersburg, 1868, and to those which are not.

In order that there may be no doubt that the use of false external
marks is not .a legitimate ruse it has been specifically prohibited.
By later provisions in the rules, the use of false external marks is
made a ground for capture and condemnation of a neutral aircraft.
What ·a re here referred to are false marks of nationality or char:acter, the marks which are dealt with in Chapter I of these rules.
'T he article would not apply to mere squadron badges or other em- hlems which are only of interest to one particular belligerent force.
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ARTICLE

19

The use of false external marks is forbidden.

Another mode of injuring the en~my, which it has seemed desirable to prohibit, is that of firing at airmen escaping from a disabled
aircraft.
ARTICLE

20

'Vhen an aircraft has been disabled, the occupants, when endeavouring to•
escape by means of a parachute, must not be attacked in the course of theirdescent.

Incidents took place in the recent -vvar which sho-vved the desirability of having a distinct rule on the question whether the dropping·
of leaflets for propaganda purposes was a legitimate means of
warfare.
Attempts were made by one belligerent to impose heavy penalties on.
airmen who were forced to descend within his lines after engaging in.
this work.
Article 21 has been framed to meet this case. It is not limited to·
dropping leaflets, as aircraft can disseminate propaganda by othermeans, such for instance, as emitting trails of smoke in the form of
words in the sky.
What is legalised by the article is the use of aircraft for distrib-uting propaganda. It does not follo-vv that propaganda of all kindsis thereby validated. Incitements to murder or assassination \vill,.
:for instance, still be considered illegitimate forms of propaganda.
ARTICLE

21

The use of aireraft for the purpose of disseminating propaganda shall not
be treated as an illegitimate means of warfare.
Members of the cr ews of such aircraft must not be deprived of their rightsas prisoners of war on the eharge that they have committed such an act.
BOMBARDMENT

The subject of bombardment by aircraft is one of the most difficult,
to deal with in framing any code of rules for aerial warfare.
The experiences of the recent war have left in the mind of the\Vorld at large a lively horror of the havoc which can be wrought by
the indiscriminate launching of bombs and projectiles on the noncombatant populations of towns and cities. The conscience of mankind revolts against this form of making war in places outside the
actual theatre of military operations, and the feeling is universal
that limitations must be imposed.
On the other hand, it is equally clear that the- airc-raft is a potent.
engine of ·w ar, and no State \vhich realises the possibility that it n1ay
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itself be attacked, and the use to which its adversary may put his
air forces can take the risk of fettering its o·wn liberty of action to an
extent which would restrict it from attacking its enemy 'vhere that
adversary may legitimately be attacked with effect. It is useless~
therefore, to enact prohibitions unless there is an equally clear understanding of what constitute legitimate objects of attack, and it , is
precisely in this respect that agree1nent was difficult to reach.
Before passing to a consideration of the articles 'vhich have been
agreed, mention must be made of the Declaration prohibiting the
Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, signed at
The Hague in 1907. Three of the States represented on the Com-.
mission 22 are parties to that Declaration; the other three are not.
Under the terms of this Declaration the Contracting Powers agree.
to prohibit the discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons,
or by other new methods of a similar nature. Its terms are, there . .
fore, 'vide enough to cover bombardment by aircraft. On the otherhand, the scope of the Declaration is very limited; in duration it is.
to last only until the close of the Third Peace Conference, a conference which was to have been summoned for 1914 or 1915, and its_
application is confined to a war between contracting States without.
the participation of a non-contracting State.
The existence of this Declaration can afford no solution of the.
problems arising out of the question o:f bombardment from the air,
even for the States which are parties to it.
The number of parties is so small that, even if the Declaration
were renewed,- no confidence could ever be felt that when a war broke
out it would apply. A general agreement, therefore, on the subject
of bombardment from the air is much to be desired. For the States,
which are parties to it, ho,vever, the Declaration exists and it is well
that the legal situation should be clearly understood.
As between the parties it· will continue in force and will operate in
the event of a war between them, unless by mutual agreement its .
terms are modified, or an understanding reached that it shall be .
regarded as replaced by some new conventional stipulation; but it
'viii in any case cease to operate at the moment when a Third Peace,
Conference concludes its labours, or if any State 'vhich is not a party
to the Declaration intervenes in the war as a belligerent.
No difficulty was found in reaching an agreement that there are.
certain purposes for which aerial bombardment is inadmissible.
Article 22 has been formulated with this object.
22

United States of America, Great Britain, and The Netherlands.
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ARTICLE

22

Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorising the civilian population,
of destroying or damaging private property not of military character, or of
1njuring non-combatants is prohibited.
I

The Naval Bombardment Convention of 1907 (No. IX) allows
bombardment for enforcing payment of requisitions for supplies
necessary for the immediate use of the naval for·ces (article 3), but
_not for enforcing payment of money contributions (article 4).
For aerial warfare it has been decided to adopt the more stringent
rule of the Land Warfare Regulations.
ARTICLE

23

Aerial bon1bardment for the purpose of enforcing compliance with requisitions in kind or payment of contributions in money is prohibited.

Agreement on the following article specifying the objects which
:m ay legitimately be bombarded from the air vvas not reached without
prolonged discussion. Numerous proposals ·were put forwad by the
various delegations before unanimity \Vas ultimately attained. The
text of these proposals \vill be found in the minutes. In particular,
mention may be made of an Italian proposal of the 8th February,
on which the text ultimately adopted \Vas in great part founded.
Regret was expressed by some delegations that a more far-reaching
prohibition did not meet with unanimous acceptance.
The terms of the article are so clear that no explanation of the
provisions is necessary, but it may be well to state that in the phrase
in paragraph 2 "military es~ablishments or depots" the word
"' depots " is intended to cover all collections of supplies for military
use \vhich have passed into the possession o:f the military authorities
and are ready for deli very to the forces, " distinctively military
supplies" in the succeeding phrase is intended to cover those which
by their nature show that they are certainly manufactured for
military purposes.
If the code of rules of aerial \varfare should eventually be annexed
to a convention, paragraph 5 of the article would find a more appropriate place in the convention.
It \vill be noticed that for aerial bombardment the test adopted
in article 25 of the Land Warfare Regulations, that of the town, &c.,
being defended, is abandoned. The nature of the objective or the use
to which it is being put now becomes the test.
ARTICLE

24

1. Aerial bombardinent is legitin1ate only when directed at a

military
obje~tive, that is to say, an object of which the destruction or injury would
<Constitute a distinct military advantage to the belligerent.
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2. Such bombardn1ent is legitimate only when directed exclusively at the
following objectives ; military forces ; military works; military establishments or depots; factories constituting important and well-known centres engaged in the manufacture of arms, ammunition or distinctively military supplies; lines of communication or transportation used for military purposes.
3. The bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings not in
the immediate neighbourhood of the operations of land forces is prohibited.
In cases where the objectives specified in paragraph 2 are so situated that they
cannot be bombarded without the indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian
population, the aircraft must abstain from bombardment.
4. In the immediate neighbourhood of the operations of land forces, the
bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings is legitimate
provided that there exists a reasonable presumption that the military concentration is sufficiently important to justify such bombardment, having regard
i:o the danger thus caused to the civilian population.
5. A belligerent State is liable to pay compensation for injuries to person or
to property caused by the violation by any of its officers or forces of the provisions of this article.

Both in land warfare and in maritime warfare the principle has
been adopted that certain special classes of buildings must be spared
so far as possible in case of bombardment; for the former, by
article 27 of the Land 'iV arfare Regulations, for the latter by article 5
of the Naval Bombardment Convention of 1907 (No. IX). A similar provision, largely based on that in the Naval Bombardment Convention, has been adopted as article 25. By day, these privileged
buildings must be marked in a way which will make them visible to
aircraft; the marks agreed on being those laid down in the Geneva
Convention and in the Naval Bombardment Convention; the use of
such marks is made obligatory so as to correspond with the duty
placed on the adversary of sparing such buildings. By night, however, the use of lights to make the special signs visible is optional,
because experience has shown that such lights may serve as guides to
night-flying aircraft and may thereby be of service to the enemy.
ARTICLE

25

In bombardment by aircraft, all necessary steps must be taken by the
commander to spare as far as possible buildings dedicated to public worship,
art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospital ships, hospitals and other places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided such
buildings, objects or places are not at the time used for military purposes.
Such buildings, objects and places must by day be indicated by marks visible
to aircraft. The use of marks to indicate other buildings, objects or places than
those specified above is to be deemed an act of perfidy. The marks used · as
aforesaid shall be in the case of buildings protected under the Geneva Convention the red cross on a white ground, and in the case of other protected
buildings a large rectangular panel divided diagonally into two pointed
triangular portions, one black and the other white.
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A belligerent who desires to secure by night the protection for the hospitals.
and other privileged buildings above mentioned must take the necessary
measures to render the special signs referred to sufficiently visible.
'

A proposal was submitted by the Italian Delegation for the purpose of securing better protection from aerial bombardment for
important historic monuments. During the recent war it was not
found that the articles in the Land Warfare Regulations and the
Naval Bombardment Convention were sufficient to prevent historic
monuments from being bombarded. An unscruplous opponent can
always allege that they are being used for military purposes and
ignore the written agreements accordingly. There is also the possibility that in the attack on some object ·which is a legitimate subject
for bombardment, a historic monument in the immediate vicinity
may be injured.
The Italian proposal comprised two new features, the creation of a
zone round each historic monument ·within which the State \Vas to
be debarred from committing any act which constituted a use of the
area for military purposes, and a system of inspection under neutral
auspices to ensure that the undertaking was carried out, both as
regards the monument itself and the zone. By this means any
pretext for the bombardment would be removed, and the risk of
unintentional injury would be minimised.
The proposal received the sy1npathetic consideration of all the
Delegations and it \Vas accordingly ren1itted to an expert com1nittee
for more detailed consideration. Article 26 has been prepared in the
light of their report.
The Italian proposal comprised not only historic but also artistic
monuments. It has seemed better to omit the word " artistic " for
fear lest .a divergence should appear to be created between the new
article and article 25, the language of which is modelled on article 27
of the I.Jand Warfare Regulations and article 5 of the Naval Bombardment Convention (No. IX of 1907). The 'vords "historic monum~nt " in this article are used in a broad sense. They cover all
monuments which by reason of their great artistic value are historic
to-day or will become historic in the future.
It should be clearly understood that adoption of the system is only
permissive. If a State prefers to trust only to article 25 to secure
protection of its monuments, there is no obligation upon it to notify
them to other Powers in peace time and to establish the surrounding
zones which are not to be used for military purposes.
The notification must be made through the diplomatic channel.
It will then be open to any State receiving the notification, if it thinks
it necessary to do so, to question 'vithin a reasonable time the propriety of regarding a particular place as an historic monument. If no
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monuments notified, other
States will be regarded as having accepted the demand for the protection of such monuments from bombardment, and the immunity
For the same reason the
will then rest on the basis of agreement.
notification once made must not be withdrawn after the outbreak of
question

is

raised with regard to the

hostilities.

Considerable hesitation was expressed in accepting the provision
that notification must be made in time of peace. It was urged that
the system proposed was a new procedure, that particular monuments might be forgotten, and that more elasticity should be allowed.
On the other hand, it was urged that the essence of the scheme was

agreement as to the immunity of these monuments, and that
unless notification in time of war was excluded, it was not likely that
any would be notified in time of peace.
The effect of allowing a 500-metre zone to be drawn round each
to get

monument may

well be that in certain special cases, as, for instance,

Venice or Florence, which are particularly rich in ancient and
historic monuments, a large portion of the city would be comprised
within the protected zones. The zones round each monument will
overlap and so create a continuous area. The subsequent provisions
will, however, ensure that there is a complete absence of military
use of any portion of the area so protected.
It

was agreed that

if

the belligerents did not for military reasons

enemy aviators had no right
bombard the zone in question,

place the signs indicated in the article,

by reason merely of their absence to
if it had been duly determined and notified.

In their report, the experts stated that they considered that llie
marks designed to indicate the zones of protection round monuments
should differ in design from those prescribed by article 25 for the
historic monuments themselves.
The Commission took note of this
r ecommen d a t ion
The prohibition against the use of the zone surrounding the
monument must be very strictly interpreted. There must be a complete cessation of the use of any place, including, for instance,
factories and railwa}^ lines, with a military purpose in view.
The special committee of inspection provided for by the article
will be constituted by the State which has taken advantage of the
article.
There would not seem to be any need to establish the committee until the outbreak of war. As these special arrangements
will have to be made in order to secure full protection for its historic
monuments, the State will be bound to afford to this committee the
fullest opportunity for making the investigations they may think
necessary.
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ARTICLE

26

The following special rules are adopted for the purpose of enabling States to
obtain more efficient protection for important historic n1onuments situated
within their territory, provided that they are willing to refrain from the use
of such monuments and a surrounding zone for military rmrposes, and to
accept a special regime _for their inspection :
1. A State shall be entitled, if it sees fit, to establish a zone of protection
round such monuments situated in its territory. Such zones shall in times of
war enjoy immunity from bombardment.
2. The monuments round which a zone is to be established shall be notified
to other Powers in peace time through the diplomatic channel; the notification shall also indicate the limits of the zones. The notification 1nay not be
withdrawn in time of war.
3. The zone of protection may include, in addition to the area actually occupied by the monument or group of monuments, an outer zone, not exceeding
500 metres in width, measured from the circumference of the said area.
4. Marks clearly visible fro~ aircraft either by day or by night will be
employed for the purpose of ensuring the identification by belligerent airmen
of the limits of the zones.
5. The marks on the monuments themselves will be those defined in article
25. The marks employed for indicating the surrounding zones will be fixed
by each State adopting the provisions of this article, and will be notified to
other Powers at the same time as the monuments and zones are notified.
6. Any abusive use of the marks indicating the zones referred to in paragraph 5 will be regarded as an act of perfidy.
7. A State adopting the provisions of this article must abstain from using
the monument and the surrounding zone for military purposes, or for the
benefit in any way whatever of its military organisation, or from committing
within such monument or zone any act with a military purpose in view.
8. An inspection committee consisting of ·three neutral representatives
ac& edited to the State adopting the provisions of this article, or their delegates, shall be appointed for the purpose of ensuring that no violation is
committed of the provisions of paragraph 7. One of the members of the
committee of inspection shall be the representative (or his delegate) of the
State to whi~h has been entrusted the interests of the opposing belligerent.
ESPIONAGE

The articles dealing with espionage follow closely the precedent
. of the Land Warfare Regulations.
Article 27 is a verbal adaptation of the first paragraph of article
29 of the Regulations, so phrased as to limit it to acts committed
while in the air.
Consideration has been given to the question whether there was
any need to add td the provision ·instances of actions which were not
to be deemed acts of espionage, such as those which are given at the
end o:f article 29 in the Regulations, and it was suggested that
article 29 23 of the American draft might appropriately be introduced in this manner. It was decided that this was unnecessary.
28
Acts of the personnel of correctly marked enemy aircraft, public or private, done or
performed while in the air, are not to be deemed espionage.
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The article sumitted by the American Delegation was intended to
ensure that reconnaissance work openly done behind the enemy lines
by aircraft should not be treated as spying. It is not thought likely
that a~y belligerent \vould attempt to treat it as such.
ARTICLE

27

Any person on board a belligerent or neutral aircraft is to be deemed a spy
only if acting clandestinely or on false pretences he obtains or seeks to obtain, while in the air, information within belligerent jurisdiction or in the
zone of operations of a belligerent with the intention of communicating it to
the hostile party.

Acts of espionage by members of the cre"r of an aircraft or by
persons \vho have been carried in an aircraft may well be committed after they have left the aircraft. They will in that case
be subject to the Land Warfare Regulations.
ARTICLE

28

Acts of espionage comn1itted after leaving the aircraft by members of the
crew of an aircraft or by passengers transported by it are subject to the provision':l of the Land 'Varfare Regulations.

Two rules have been adopted in land warfare with respect to
espionage \V hich should apply equally to aerial warfare. These
are that a spy cannot be punished \vithout previous trial, and that
a member of an army who commits an act of espionage and succeeds in rejoining the army cannot, if he is subsequently captured,
be made responsible for the previous act of espionage. He is entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war.
ARTICLE

29

Punishment of the acts of espionage referred to in articles 27 and 28 is
subject to articles 30 and 31 of the Land Warfare Regulations.
CHAPTER

\T.

MILITARY AUTHORITY OVER ENEl\IY AND NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AND PERSONs ON BoARD

The rapidity of its flight would enable an aircraft to embarrass
the operations of land or sea forces, or even operations in the air,
to an extent which might prove most inconvenient or even disastrous to a belligerent commander. To protect belligerents from
improper intrusions of this kind, it is necessary to authorise belligerent commanders to warn off the intruders, and, if the warning is
disregarded, to con1pel their retirement by opening fire.
It is easy to see that undue hardship might be occasioned to
neutrals if advantage \vere taken of the faculty so conferred on
belligerent co1nmanding officers and attempts "'ere made to exclude
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for long or indefinite periods all neutrals :from stipulated areas or
to prevent communication between different countries through the
air over the high seas. The present provision only authorises a
commanding officer to warn off aircraft during the duration o:f the
operations in which he is engaged at the time. The right o:f neutral
aircraft to circulate in the airspace over the high seas is emphasised
by the provisions o:f article 11, which provides that "outside the
jurisdiction o:f any State, belligerent or neutral, all aircraft shall
have :full freedom o:f passage through the air and o:f alighting."
Article 30 is confined in terms to neutral aircraft, because enemy
aircraft are in any event exposed to the risk o:f capture, and in the
vicinity o:f military operations are subjected to more drastic treatment than that provided by this article.
It will be noticed that the terms of the article are general in
character and would comprise even neutral public or military aircraft. It goes 'vithout saying that the article is not intended to
imply any encroachment on the rights o:f neutral States. It is
assumed that no neutral public or military aircraft would depart so
widely :from the practice o:f States as to attempt to interfere \vith
or intrude upon the operations o:f a belligerent State.
ARTICLE

30

In case a belligerent commanding officer considers that the presenee of airc raft is likely to prejudice the success of the operations in which he is engaged at the moment, he may prohibit the passing of neutral aircraft in the
immediate vicinity of his forces or may oblige them to follow a particular •
route. A neutral aircraft which does not conform to such directions, of which
he has had notice issued by the belligerent commanding officer, may be fired
upon.

The power to 1~quisition aircraft in occupied enemy territory is
recognised in article 53 o:f the Land W ar:fare Regulations. The text
t>:f article 53 is not specific as to whether it includes neutral property,
and though in practice it is regarded as doing so, it has been thought
well to adopt a special rule in harmony with article 53. It is not
unreasonable that neutral owners o:f property should receive payment
for their property at once, as they are not concerned with the peace
which will be ultimately concluded.
ARTICLE

31

In accordance with the principles of article 53 of the Land \Varfare Regulations, neutral private aircraft found upon entry in the ene1ny's jurisdiction by
a belligerent occupying force may be requisitioned, subject to the payment of
full compensation.

Property o:f the enemy State, \vhich may be used :for operations
of war, is al,vays liable to confiscation i:f it :falls into the hands o:f the
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·opposing belligerent. It is natural, therefore, that public aircraft
Df the enemy should be so treated.
Article 17 will create an exception in favour of flying ambulances
.as they will be protected by article 6 of the Geneva Convention,
but this exception will be subject to the principle laid down in
.article 7 of the same Convention that the protection accorded to
mobile medical units ceases if they are made use of to commit acts
barmful to the enemy.
ARTICLE

32

Enemy public aircraft, other than those treated on the same footing as pri-vate aircraft, shall be subject to confiscation \Yithout prize proceedings.

Non-military aircraft of belligerent nationality, whether public
or private, should not in general be exposed to the risk of instant
-destruction, but should be give:q. the opportunity to land. I£ they
.are flying in the jurisdiction of their own State and enemy military
.aircraft appro~ch, they should, for their own protection, make the
nearest available landing. Failure to do so exposes them to the
Tisk of being fired upon.
ARTICLE

33

Belligerent non-military aircraft, whether public or private, flying within
jurisdiction of their own State, are liable to be fired lll )On unless they make
the nearest available landing on the approach of enemy 1uilitary aircraft.

~the

The preceding article has dealt with the case of belligerent non· m ilitary aircraft flying in the jurisdiction , of their own State.
.Article 34 deals with the same category of aircraft in certain other
circumstances. I£ such aircraft are in the immediate vicinity of
-.t he territory of the enemy State, or in the immediate vicinity of its
.military operations by land or sea, they run the risk of being fired
upon. They are, of course, liable to capture by reason of their
Bnemy status, but in an area ·where it is probable that military
operations will be in progress, or in any place where they are actually
in progress, non -combatant aircraft of belligerent nationality can
,only proceed at their o'vn risk. By their mere presence they expose
themselves to the risk of being fired upon.
ARTICLE

34

Belligerent non-military aircraft, whether public or private, are liable to be
upon, if they fly ( 1) within the jurisdiction of the enemy, or ( 2) in the
-immediate vicinity thereof and outside the jurisdiction of their own State, or
(3) in the immediate vicinity of the military operations of the enem:f by
J and or sea.
~fired

The principle has already been recognised in article 30 that a
~1~elligerent commanding officer may warn off neutral aircraft from
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the immediate vicinity of his 1nilitary operations. If they fail to
comply with such a warning, they run the risk of being fired upon.
Article 35 deals with neutral aircraft which may be flying within
the jurisdiction of a belligerent country at a moment when military
aircraft of the opposing belligerent ·approach. If warned of the
approach of such military aircraft, it is their duty to make a landing; otherwise they might hamper the movements of the combatants
and expose themselves to the risk of being fired upon. They are not,
however, exposed to the risk of capture and condemnation as are
neutral aircraft failing to comply with directions issued by a belligerent commander under article 30.
ARTICLE

35

Neutral aircraft flying within the jurisdiction of a belligerent, and warned
of the approach of military aircraft of the opposing belligerent, must make
the nearest available landing. Failure to do so exposes them to the risk of
being fired upon.

Article 36 regulates the position of members of the crew and of
passengers of an enemy aircraft which falls into the hands of a
belligerent.
If the aircraft is a military aircraft, the crew will consist of
members of the military forces and 'vill, of course, be made prisoners
of war. Any passengers will share the same fate, because in ti1ne
of war a belligerent State ·would not be using its military aircraft
for carrying non-combatant individuals unless their journey was a
matter of importance to the State. Combatant passengers would
naturally be made prisoners of war.
In the case of public non-military aircraft, the same principle
applies. It is true that the members of the crew may not be members
of the military forces, but they constitute part of the \S tate organisation. As to passengers, they would not be carried on such aircraft,
except for Government purposes. There is, however, one important
exception. A State-owned passenger-carrying aircraft line is not by
any means an unlikely development and, if such should be instituted,
there would be no reason to apply this principle to all the passengers
on such aircraft. They should only be made prisoners of war if in
the service of the enemy, or enemy nationals fit for military service.
As regards private aircraft, it must be remembered that the crew
'vill consist of trained men, constituting a reserve upon which the
belligerent can dra·w in case of need. If they are of enen1.y
nationality, or in the service of the enemy, there is good reason to
hold them as prisoners of war. If they are neutrals not in the service of the enemy, they are by their service on board an enemy aircraft releasing other men for military purposes. If they are to be
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given their release, the belligerent should be entitled to protect himself in the :future against such indirect assistance by exacting an
undertaking :fro1n each individual against his serving in an enemy
aircraft during the remainder o:f the war. Such an undertaking
corresponds to that provided :for in the second paragraph of article
5 o:f the Convention concerning restrictions on the right o:f capture
in n1aritime war (No. XI o:f 1907). It was adopted there only :for
the officers o:f a merchant vessel, because the officers are the highly
trained men. In the. case o:f aircraft, it is reasonable to extend it to
all the members o:f the crew.
What is said in the report on article 37 dealing with the crew and
passengers o:f netttral private aircraft as to temporary delay in
effecting the release in certain cases and as to members or the crew
or passengers vvho have rendered special services to the belligerent
being made prisoners o:f war, applies also in the case o:f the cre·w and
passengers o:f an enemy aircraft.
ARTICLE

36.

When an enemy military aircraft falls into the hands of a belligerent, the
members of the crew and the passengers, if any, may be made prisoners of
war.
The same rule applies to the men1bers of the crew and the passengers, if
nn~·, of an enemy public non-military aircraft, except that in the case of
11ublic non-military aircraft devoted exclusively to the transport of passengers, the passengers will be entitled to be released unless they are in the
service of the enemy, or are enemy nationals fit for military service.
If an enemy private aircraft falls into the hands of a belligerent, members
of the crew who are enemy nationals or who are neutral nationals in the
service of the enemy, may be made prisoners of war. Neutral members of
the crew, who are not in the service of the enemy, are entitled to be released
if they sign a written undertaking not to serve in any enemy aircraft while
hostilities last. Passengers are entitled to be released unless they are in
the service of the enemy or are enemy nationals fit for military service, in
which cases they may be made prisoners of war.
Release may in any case be delayed if the military interests of the belligerent so require.
The belligerent may hold as prisoners of war any member of the crew or
any passenger whose service in a flight at the close of which he has been
captured has been of special and active assistance to the enemy.
The names of individuals released after giving a written undertaking in
accordance with the third paragraph of this article will be notified to the
opposing belligerent, who must not knowingly employ them in violation of
their undertaking.

''Then circumstances have arisen which have led to the detention
of a neutral private aircraft by a belligerent, the question will arise
of the treatment to be meted out to the crew and to the passengers,
if any, of such aircraft. In general, the crew of an aircraft will be
very expert individuals, vvhose services ·would be of great value to a
57920-26-10
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beDigerent. If they are of enemy nationality or in the service of thefUeiny, or engaged in a violation of neutrality, there is good reason
for detaining them as prisoners of war. If not, they should bereleased unconditionally.
Passengers who are in the service of the enemy or who are enemy
nationals fit for military service may likewise be detained.
I1nmediate release of persons who cannot be made prisoners of·
'var may not in all cases be feasible. The fact that military exigencies may necessitate a temporary delay in ~ccording release does:
not prejudice the right to such release in due course.
The peculiar characteristics of aircraft may enable, members of
the crew or passengers in a neutral aircraft in time of war to render
~ervices of special importance to a belligerent. Where such serviceshave been rendered in the course of the flight in ·which such persons
'vere captured, the individuals may be made prisoners of war, whatever their nationality.
The rules adopted on this subject are in conformity with the
p ractice of the recent war, but they have not secured unanimous.
assent. · The Netherlands Delegation has felt unable to accept them
for two reasons, viz. , firstly, that they constitute an extension of the··
accepted rules of international law, and, secondly, because of the,
absence of any provision to the effect that where the detention of the ·
aircraft has taken place in circumstances which are subsequently
n1ade the subject of prize court proceedings, and the capture is held·
to be invalid, the crew and passengers of the aircraft 8hould be·
released unconditionally.
ARTICLE

37

Men1bers of the crew of a neutral aircraft which has been detained by a
lJPlligerent shall be released unconditionally, if they are neutral nationals:
clnd not in the service of the enemy. If they are enemy nationals or in the·
service of the enemy, they may be made prisoners of war.
Passengers are entitled to be released unless they are in the service of the ·
enemy or are enemy nationals fit for m~litary service, in which cases they·
1nay be made prisoners of war.
Release may in any case be delayed if the military interests of the belligerent so require.
The belligerent may hold as prisoners of war any member of the crew ora ny passenger whose service in a flight at the close of which he has been
captured has been of special and active assistance to the enemy.

'I'he phrase "prisoner of 'var" in its narrower sense is applied·
to the combatant and non-combatant members of the armed forces .
of the belligerent (see article 3 of the Land Warfare Regulations).
It is used in articles 36 and 37 in a broader sense and is applied to·
passengers or members of the crew of neutral and enemy aircraft.
who may not be members of the belligerent armed forces at all. Tot
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a void any risk of doubt as to the treatment to which such persons
are entitled article 38 lays down that their treatment shall not be
less favourable than that to which members of the armed forces are
entitled.
ARTICLE

38

Where under the provisions of articles 36 and 37 it is provided that members
of the crew or passengers may be made prisoners of war, it is to be understood
that, if they· are not members of the armed forces, they shall be entitled to
treatment not less favourable than that accorded to prisoners of war.
CHAP'l'ER

VI.

BELLIGERENT DuTIES TowARDS NEUTRAL STATEs AND

NEUTRAL DuTIES TowARDS BELLIGERENT STATES

To avoid any suggestion that it is on the neutral Government
alone that the obligation is incumbent to secure respect for its
neutrality, article 39 provides that belligerent aircraft are under
obligation to respect the rights of neutral Powers and to abstain
from acts within neutral jurisdiction which it is the neutral's duty to
prevent.
It will be noticed that the article is not limited to military aircraft;
in fact, the second phrase will apply only to belligerent aircraft of
other categories, as it is they alone which may ren1ain at liberty
·within neutral jurisdiction. All aircraft, ho·wever, including military, are bound to respect the rights of neutral Po·wers.
ARTICLE

39

Belligerent aircraft are bound to respect the rights of neutral Powers and to
abstain within the jurisdiction of a neutral State from the commission of any
act which it is the duty of that State to prevent.

The principle that belligerent military aircraft should not be allowed to enter or circulate in neutral jurisdiction 1net ·with ready
acceptance. It is in conformity with the rule adopted by the
European States during the recent war.
The immunities and privileges vv hich article 17 confers on flying
ambulances 'viii enable the neutral State to admit them to its jurisdiction, if it sees fit.
·
ARTICLE

Belligerent
neutral State.

:milit~ry

40

aircraft are forbidden to enter the jurisdiction of a

The custvraary rules of international law authorise the admission
of beUigereTlt \varshjps to neutral ports and \Vaters. There is no
obligation upon neutral States to admit vvarships belonging to belligerent States, but it is not in general refused. The admission of
belligerent military aircraft, however, is prohibited by article 40,
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and. account must therefore be taken of the fact that it has novv become the practice for warships to have a certain number of aircraft
assigned to them and that these aircraft usually rest on board the
'varshi p. While th,:~y remain on board the warship they form part of
i t~ and should be regarded as such from the point of vievv of the regulations issued by the neutral States. They will therefore be allo·wed
to enter the neutral jurisdiction on the same footing as the warship
on board w·hich they l'est, but_.Ehey must remain on_b~~-I~g__t_he_.1Varship and must not co1nmit any act vvhich the warship is not allowed
to ... commit .
...........
_.

-.

ARTICLE

41

Aircraft on board vessels of war, including aircraft-carriers, shall be rt;garded as part of such vessels.

'rhe principle is vvnH established in land vvarfare that co1nbatant
forces of a belligerent must not penetrate within neutral jurisdictior~.
I£ they do, they are beyond the reach of their enemy: they have
entered what is to the1n an asylun1, and consequently, if after their
visit to neutral territory they were allowed to re-enter hostilities,
they would be making use of neutral territory to the detri1nent of
their adversary.
From this principle arises a duty, which is incumbent on all
neutral States, to do "-'"hat they can to prevent combatant forces from
entering their jurisdiction, and to intern those which do. These
principles are recognised and adopted for aerial warfare by article
42. The obligation to intern covers also aircraft which 'vere 'vithin
the neutral jurisdiction at the outbreak of hostilities.
Where aircraft and their personnel are in distress and seek
shelter in neutral territory, knowing that their fate will be internInent, or where the entry is due to the fact that the aircraft has lost
its bearings or experienced engine trouble or run out of fuel, the
neutral State is under no obligation to exclude them; it is, in fact,
morally bound to admit them. This is due to the principle that
those who are in distress must be succoured. The prohibition in the
article is aimed at those who enter in violation of the rights of the
neutral State.
The prohibition on entry into neutral jurisdiction leads naturally
to the further obligation incumbent upon neutral States to enforce
compliance 'vith the rule. !t__is beypnd ~t.b-~ povver of any neut~al
State to ensure that no belligerent military ai~craft will ever--v!(;late
its neutrality; its obligation is limited to the employment _ ()_~ _ tl].~
means at its disposal, conforming in this respect to the phraseology
e1nployed in the Convention dealing 'vith the Rights and Dut~es of
Nelitral Po,vers in Maritime !Yar (No. XIII of 1907).
~ . --- ·-- ~
l
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The provision in the article is limited to military aircraft because
it is only in respect of such craft that the prohibition on entry is
absolute. Under article 12 the admission of private or public nonmilitary aircraft is "'ivithin the discretion of the neutral State.
Where such aircraft penetrate "\vithin neutral jurisdiction in violation of the measures prescribed by the neutral Power, they will be
subject to such penalties as the neutral Po·wer may enact; these may
or may not include internment. Recognition of this fact has enabled the Commission to omit a provision which figured as article
11 in the American draft:

. . .-.

A neutral Government may intern any aircraft of belligerent nationality
~.... -..
not conforming to its regulations.

--

----.._.._.._~....

The obligation on the part of the neutral PoV\rer to intern covers
not only the aircraft, but its equipment and contents. The obligation
is not affected by the circu1nstance which led to the military aircraft
coming within the jurisdiction. It applies whether the belligerent
aircraft entered neutral jurisdiction, voluntarily or involuntarily,
and whatever the cause. It is an obligation owed to the opposing
belligerent and is based upon the fact that the aircraft has come into
an area "'ivhere it is not subject to attack by its opponent.
The only exceptions to the obligation to intern an aircraft are
those arising under articles 17 and 41. The first relates to flying
ambulances. Under the second, an aircraft on board a warship is
deemed to be part of her, and therefore "'ivill follow the fate of that
·warship if she enters neutral ports or waters. If she enters under
circumstances which render her immune from internment, such aircraft will like·wise escape internment.
The obligation to intern belligerent military aircraft entering
neutral jurisdiction entails also the obligation to intern the personneL
These will in general be combatant members of the belligerent fighting forces, but experience has already sho·wn that in time of war
military aeroplanes are employed for transporting passengers. As
it may safely be assumed that in time of war a passenger ·would not
be carried on a belligerent military aircraft unless his journey was
a matter of i1nportance to the Government, it seems reasonable also
to comprise such passengers in the category of persons to be interned.
ARTICLE

42

A neutral Government must use the means at its disposal to prevent the
entry within its jurisdiction of belligerent military aircraft and to compel
them to alight if they have entered such jurisdiction.
A neutral Government shall use the means at its disposal to intern any
belligerent military aircraft which is within its jurisdiction after having
alighted for any reason whatsoever, together with its crew and the passengers, if any.
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, Under article 15 o£ the Convention for the adaptation of the principles of the Geneva Convention to Maritime War (No. X of 1907),
the ship". . recked, wounded or sick n1embers of the cre'v of a belligerent ·warship, who are brought into a neutral port, must be
interned. The same rule is applied by article 43 to the personnel of a
disabled belligerent military aircraft, when the men are brought in
·On board a military aircraft. It goes without saying that such
individuals could not be brought in and landed at a neutral port
·without the consent of the neutral authorities.
ARTICLE

43

The personnel of a disabled belligerent military aircraft rescued outside
neutral waters and brought into the jurisdiction of a neutral State by a
neutral military aircraft and there landed shall be interned.

The principle is well established in, international law that in time
of war a Government, which remains neutral, must not itself supply
to a belligerent Government arms or war material. For aerial warfare effect is given to this principle by the following article:
ARTICLE

44

The supply in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral Government
t o a belligerent Power of aircraft, parts of aircraft, or material, supplies or
munitions required for aircraft is forbidden.

No obligation rests on a neutral State to prevent the purchase by
a belligerent Governn1ent of articles o£ contraband :from persons
within the neutral jurisdiction. The purchase of contraband under
such conditions constitutes a commercial transaction which the
neutral Government is under no obligation to prevent, although the
opposing belligerent may take such means as international law
authorises to intercept the delivery of the articles to his enemy.
This principle has already been embodied in article 7 of the Convention concerning the rights and duties of neutral Powers in land war
(Convention V of 1907) and in article 7 of the corresponding convention :for maritime war (Convention XIII of 1907). To apply it
to aerial warfare, the following article ha.s been adopted :
ARTICLE

45

Subject to the provisiops of article 46, a neutral Power is not bound to
p revent the export or transit on behalf of a belligerent of aircraft, parts of
aircraft, or material, supplies or munitions for aircraft.

An exception to the principle that a neutral State is under no
obligation to prevent the export of arms and 'var material, is found
in the accepted rule of international law that neutral territory must
not be utilised as a base of operations by a belligerent Government,
and that the neutral State must therefore prevent the fitting out or
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departure from its jurisdiction of any hostile expedition intended
to operate on behalf of one belligerent against the other. Such an
expedition might consist of a single aeroplane, i:f manned and
equipped in _a n1anner which would enable it to take part in hostilities, or carrying or acco1n panied by the necessary elements of such
equipment. Consequently, its departure under circumstances ·which
would constitute the despatch of a hostile expedition, must be prevented by the neutral Government.
It is easy to see that it is aircraft which have flo,vn out of the
neutral jurisdiction, which are most likely to engage in hostilities
in some forn1 before delivery to the belligeTent purchaser in the belligerent State, and it is in these cases that the neutral Government
must take special precautions. All risk will be a voided if the aircraft, despatched to the order of a belligerent Power, does not come
·w ithin the neighbourhood of the operations of the opposing belligerent. The neutral State should therefore prescribe the route which
the aircraft is to follow. This alone, however, will not be sufficient.
The aircraft might ignore the instructions it receives_! Guarantees
for compliance must therefore be exacted. It will be for the neutral
State to determine the guarantees which it thinks necessary, but they
must be effective guarantees, such, for instance, as insisting on the
aircraft carrying a representative of the Government to see that the
route indicated is followed.
To meet these requirements, the following article has been
adopted:
ARTICLE

46

A neutral Government is bound to use the means at its disposal:
1. To prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of an aircraft in a
condition to make a hostile attack against a belligerent Power, or
carrying or accompanied by appliances or materials the mounting
or utilisation of which would enable it to make a hostile attack, if
there is reason to believe that such aircraft is destined for use
against a belligerent Power.
2. To prevent the departure of an aircraft the crew of which includes
any member of the combatant forces of a belligerent Power.
3. To prevent work upon an aircraft designed to prepare it to depart in contravention of the purposes of this article.
On the departure by air of any aircraft despatched by persons or companies
in neutral jurisdiction to the order of a belligerent Power, the neutral Government must prescribe for such aircraft a rC!ute avoiding the neighbourhood
of the military operations of the opposing belligerent, and must exact whatever guarantees may be required to ensure that the aircraft follows the route
prescribed.

The height to which aircraft can ascend would enable them to b 2
used for observation purposes from a spot within neutral jurisdiction, i. e., within the airspace above neutral teTritory or territorial
waters, if ho_stilities were in progress close to the frontier between
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two States. Such proceedings might be extremely harmful to belligerent interests, and if the observations were 1nade on behalf of one
of the belligerents and for the purpose of supplying him with information, would amount to an improper use of neutral territory. To
meet this contingency, the following provision has been adopted :
ARTICLE

47

A neutral State is bound to take such steps as the means at its disposal
permit to prevent within its jurisdiction aerial observation of the movements,
operations or defences of one belligerent, with the intention of informing the
other belligerent.

rrhe prohibition of aerial observation within neutral territory on
b::Jligerent account must apply equally to the case of aircraft on
board belligerent warships when in neutral waters. To avoid all
misconception on this point, the following paragraph has been
added:
This provision applies equally to a belligerent military aircraft on board a
vessel of war.

The measures which a neutral Government may be obliged to take
to compel respect for its rights may entail the use of force; fire may
have to be opened on foreign aircraft, even military aircraft of
another State. Following the analogy of article 10 of Convention V
of 1907 (Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Land War) and
article 26 of Convention XIII (Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers in Maritime War), it has been thought well to declare ·that
the measures, even of force, taken by a neutral Power for this purpose cannot be regarded as acts of war. Still less could they be regarded as unfriendly acts, seeing that they are taken in specific
exercise of rights conferred or recognised by treaty.
It may be well to add that the neutral Government will not be
responsible for any injury or damage done to the aircraft or other
object.
ARTICLE

48

The action of a neutral Power in using force or other means at its disposal
in the exercise of its rights or duties under these rules cannot be regarded as
a hostile act.
CHAPTER

VII.

VISIT AND SEARCH, CAPTURE AND CONDEMNATION

Both the American and British drafts when first submitted to the
Commission provided for the use of aircraft in exercising against
enemy commerce the belligerent rights whi~h international law has
sanctioned. This principle has not met with unanimous acceptance;
the ~etherlands Delegation has not felt able to accept it. The stand-

VISIT AND SEARCH

137'

point adopted by this Delegation is that the custom and practice ofinternational law is limited to a right on the part of belligerent warships to capture after certain formalities merchant vessels employed
in the carriage of such commerce. No justification exists :for the extension of those rights to an aircraft, which is a new engine of war
' entirely different in character :from a warship and unable to exercise·
over merchant v~ssels or private aircraft a control similar to that
exercised by a warship over merchant vessels. Consequently there·
is no reason to confer on a military aircraft the right to make captures.
as if it were a warship, and no reason to subject commerce to capture
when carried in an aircraft. In developing international law the·
tendency should be in the direction of conferring greater, not less,.
immunity on private property.
For these reasons the Netherlands Delegation has not accepted,
the rules contained in Chapter VII and its participation in the dis-cussion of individual rules has been subject to the general reserves.
n1ade with regard to the whole chapter.
The majority of the delegations have not felt able to reject the·
principle that the aircraft should be allowed to exercise the bellig-erent right to visit and search, :follo·wed by capture where necessary
:for the repression of enemy commerce carried in an aircraft in cases:
where such action is permissible. This princi pie is embodied in.
article 49, o:f ·which the text is as :follows:
ARTICLE

49

Private aircraft are liable to visit and search and to capture by belligerent
military aircraft.

No article on the subject of the exercise by belligerent military·
aircraft of the right of visit and search of merchant vessels has secured the votes of a majority of the Delegations, and therefore no ,
article on the subject is included in the code o:f rules. Nevertheless,
all the Delegations are impressed with the necessity· of surrounding
with proper safeguards the use of aircraft against merchant vessels.
Otherwise excesses analogous to those which took place during the,
recent war might be reproduced in :future wars.
The reason why no agreed text has been adopted by the Commission is due to divergence of view as to what action an aircraft should
be permitted to take against a merchant vessel.
The aircraft in use to-day are light and :fragile things. Except
in :favourable circumstances they would not be able to alight on the
water and send a man on board a merchant vessel at the spot where
the merchant vessel is first encountered ( visite sttr place). To make
the right of visit and search by an aircraft effective it would usually
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be necessary to direct the merchant vessel to come to some convenient locality where the aircraft can alight and send men on board
for the purpose. This ·would imply a right on the part o:f the bellig. erent military aircra:ft to con1pel the merchant vessel to deviate
fron1 her course before it 'vas in possession o:f any proo:fs derived
-:from an examination o:f the ship herself and her papers that there
w·ere circumstances o:f suspicion which justified ~uch inter:ferenc&
-with neutral trade. I:f the deviation which the merchant vessel was
·obliged to make was prolonged, as might be the case i:f the aircraft
'.Vas operating far from land, the losses and inconvenience imposed
.on neutral shipping would be very heavy.
--... Is or is not a warship entitled to oblige a merchant vessel to devi.ate from her course :for the purpose o:f enabling the right of visit
·and search to be carried out? Would an aircraft be exercising its
rights in con:formity with the rules to which .sur:face warships are
·subject if it obliged a merchant vessel to deviate :from her course in
this way? Even if a warship is entitled on occasion to oblige a
·merchant vessel to deviate :from her course before visiting her, can a
"Similar right be recognised :for military aircraft without opening the
-door to very great abuses?
These are the questions upon which the views entertained by the
_Delegations differed appreciably, and indicate the reasons why it was
not found possible to devise any text on ·which all parties could agree.
The French Delegation declared that aircraft must conform to the
rules to which sur:face warships are subject.
- The French Delegation proposed the :follo·wing text:
Aircraft are forbidden to operate against merchant vessels, whether surface
-or submarine, without conforming to the rules to which surface warships are
subject.

- - In vie'v of the differences of opinion mani:fested in regard to the
.above questions, the Delegation regarded this formula as the only
one ,vhich ,vas likely to receive the support of a majority of the Commission.
·~--' The American Delegation considered that a merchant vessel
shouJcl be boarded when she is encountered, but maintained that,
even if a departure from this rule might in exceptional circumstances
be permitt ed in visit and search by sur£ace ships, a similar concession
t o aircraft, with their limited means of boarding, would readily have
the effect of conyerting the exception into the rule. They stated
that they ~~vere not advised of anything in the record of the Washington Conference showing an intention to authorise surface ships or
submarines to divert merchant vessels, without boarding them, to a
p ort for examination; but · that, were the case otherwise, the
Washington Conference had decided that the subject of aircraft,
'vhich p r esented difficulties of its own and which might involve
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questions different from those pertaining even to submarines, -should
be dealt with separately; and that to permit aircraft, with their
rapidity and range of flight, to control and direct by orders enforceable by bombing, and without visit and search, the movement of
merchant vessels on the high seas ·would, in their opinion, give rise
to an inadmissible situation.
The American Delegation, therefore, proposed the following text:
Aircraft are forbidden to visit and search surface or subsurface vessels
without conforming in all respects to the rules to which surface vessels authorized to conduct visit and search are subject.
In view of the irregularities to which the use of aircraft against merchant
vessels might give rise, it is declared that aircraft cannot divert a merchant
vessel from its course without first boarding it; that in no event may an aircraft destroy a merchant vessel unless the crew and passengers of such vessel
have first been placed in safety; and that if an aircraft cannot capture a
merchant vessel in conformity with these rules it must desist from attack and
from seizure and permit such vessel to proceed unmolested.

The British Delegation maintained that the problem connected
with visit and search of merchant vessels by aircraft was analogous
to that of the exercise of such right by submarines, and that the most
satisfactory solution of the problem would be to apply mutatis
mutandis the wording of article 1 of the T'reaty signed at Washington on the 6th February, 1922, for the protection of the lives of
neutrals and non-combatants at sea in time of war.
This Delegation maintained that by using the language o:f that
treaty, as proposed, the question of the right to oblige a merchant
vessel to deviate to a reasonable extent would be solved because the
wording adopted at Washington had been modified so as to admit this
right. The British Delegates proposed the following text :
The use of aircraft against merchant vessels must be regulated by the following provisions, which, being in conformity with the rules adopted by civilised nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and non-combatants at
sea in time of war, are to be deemed an established part of international
law:A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and search to determine
its character before it can be seized.
A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuses to submit to visit
and search after warning or to proceed as directed after seizure.
A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers have
first been placed in safety.
Belligerent .air.c raft are not under any circumstances exempt from the universal rules above .stated ; and if an aircraft cannot capture a merchant vessel in
eonformity with these rules, the existing law of nations requires it to desist
from attack and from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed
unmolested.

The Japanese view was based on the practical difficulty in the
way of exercise of the right of visit and search by aircraft. Visit and
search is a n.ecessary preliminary to capture, and unless an aircraft
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is physically capable of carrying it out, the recognition of the right of
military aircraft to conduct operations against merchant vessels may
lead to a recurrence of the excesses practised against enemy and
neutral merchant vessels in the submarine campaign initiated during·
the recent war. Therefore, the Japanese Delegation preferred not.
to recognise the right at all. But, in the end, as the amended
American text 24 removed the greater part of their fear of possible·
abuse, they expressed readiness to accept it, and suggested at the·
same time that the text had better be completed by the addition of
the last sentence of the British text.
The Italian Delegation accepted the British point of view; it
maintained that diversion of merchant vessels by surface warships
was recognised and that the wording of the Washington Treaty
should be repeated. To prevent any abusive exercise of the right by
aircraft, the Italian Delegation proposed to add the follo·wing sentences to the paragraphs o£ the Washington Treaty as set out in thP·
British text:
After the first paragraph addVisit must in general be carried out where the merchant vessel is first encountered. Nevertheless, in cases where it may be impossible to alight anll
there is at the same time good ground for suspicion, the aircraft may order·
the merchant vessel to deviate to a suitable locality, reasonably accessible,.
where she may be visited. If no good cause for this action is shown, the belligerent State must pay compensation for the loss caused by the order to·
deviate.

After the third paragraph addIf the merchant vessel is in the territorial waters of the enemy State and'
not on the high seas, she may be destroyed after previous notice has been given
to the persons on board to put themselves in a place of safety and reasonabletime has been given them for so doing.

The Italian Delegation also intimated that for the sake of arrivingat an agreement, it would vote in favour of the French text given
above. In accepting it, however, it declared: (1) that in the existing
practice of 1naritime war the majority of European Powers admitted
that, if visit on the spot where the merchant vessel was encountered
was impossible, surface warships are entitled to oblige merchant
vessels to deviate to a suitable spot where the visit can take place;
(2) that, even if it is not desired to rest on the Inaritime practice
indicated above, the Italian Delegation must maintain the right of
belligerent aircraft to exercise the right of visit in accordance ·with
the texts of the amendments proposed.
The Netherlands Delegation accepted the Ame;r ican proposal as
the one which limited most narrowly the exercise of belligerent
rights by aircraft.
24

See Minute 105.
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When put to the vote the American proposal vvas supported by the
Japanese and Netherlands Delegations and opposed by the British,
French and Italian. The French proposal was opposed by the
American, British, Japanese and Ne,therlands Delegations. The
British and Italian Delegations explained that they could only
.support it if it vvas amplified in the way indicated in the British
:and Italian amendments.
Although all the Delegations concurred in the expression of a
desire to adopt such rules as would assure the observance of the
dictates of humanity as regards the protection of the lives of neutrals
:a nd non-combatants, the Commission, by reason of a divergence of
vievvs as to the method by which this result would best be attained,
was unable to agree upon an article dealing vvith the exercise of
belligerent rights by aircraft against merchant vessels. The code of
rules proposed by the Commission therefore leaves the 111atter open
/
for future regulation.
~
While aircraft are in flight in the air, the operation of visit and
search cannot be effected so long as aircraft retain their present
form. Article 49 therefore necessitates the recognition of a right
,o n the part of beUigerBnt military airci'aft to order non-military
aircraft to alight in -order that the right of visit and search may be
exercised. 'T hey must not only be ordered to alight, but they must
be allowed to proceed to a suitable locality for the purpose. It
'vould be a hardship to the neutral if he was obliged to make a long
journey for this purpose and the locality must, therefore, not only
he suitable, but must be reasonably accessible-that is, reasonably
convenient of aecess.. A ' more precise definition than' this can
scarcely be ,given; what is reasonably convenient of access is a question of fact to he determined in.each case in the light of the special
,circumstances which 1nay be present. If no place can be found
which is reasonably convenient of access, the aircraft should be
allowed to continue its flight.
As is the case with merchant vessels, a refusal to comply with
.such belligerent directions will e'xpose the aircraft to the use of force
for the purpose of insisting on compliance. Just as the belligerent
right has received universal acceptance in maritime war, so is the
principle admitted that the neutral vessel is under a duty to submit
to it and if in consequence of her failure to do so she is damaged or
sunk, she has no right to complain, seeing that she has failed to
comply with an obligation imposed upon her by the law of nations.
'T his principle does not, however, entitle a belligerent to apply force
unnecessarily. His measures of coercion must be limited to what is
reasonably required to secure the fulfilment of his object.
It is for this reason that a warship always fires a shot across the
bow of a vessel before attempting to hit the vessel herself, and, even

/-
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when obliged to fire at the vessel herself, must still take all measures
within her power to rescue the crew and passengers. Recognition of
a similar right on the part of aircraft to apply force must be conditioned by the obligation on the part of the aircraft not to apply
force to a greater extent than is necessary. It would be so easy for
the aircraft to take measures which might at once entail the destruction of the aircraft and the loss of life of everybody therein that it
is essential to recognise the principle that force must only be employed to the extent which is reasonably necessary.
ARTICLE

50

Belligerent military aircraft have the right to order public non-military and
private aircraft to alight in or proceed for visit and search to a suitable
locality reasonably accessible.
Refusal, after warning, to obey such orders to alight or to proceed to such
a locality for examination exposes an aircraft to the risk of being fired upon.

The next article deals with the position of a neutral public nonmilitary aircraft. The future of commercial aviation may involve
the establishment of State-owned lines of aircraft for commercial
purposes. The principle, has already been recognised that such aircraft must be treated upon the same footing as private aircraft ..
Their subjection to the exercise of the right of visit and search and
capture must, there.f ore, be assured. Where public non-military
aircraft are not used for commercial_purposes, the general rule must
apply according to ·which a belligerent warship can only visit the
public vesse~ls of a friendly Power so far as may be necessary for the
purpose of ascertaining their character, i. e., by the verification of
their papers.
ARTICLE

51

Neutral public non-military aircraft, other than those which are to be
treated as private aircraft, are subject only to visit for the purpose of the
verification of their papers.

Article 52 applies to aircraft in time of war the principle which
already obtains in the case of merchant vessels, namely, that
enemy merchant vessel is liable to capture in all circumstances.

an

ARTICLE

52

Enemy private aircraft are liable to capture in all circumstances.

The next article deals with the grounds upon which a neutral
private aircraft may be captured.
(a) The first is ·where it resists the legitimate exercise of belligerent rights. This is in harmony 'vith article 63 of the Declaration
of London. As first submitted to the Commission, the text included
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the words "or flees." On due consideration, however, these words
were omitted. The reasons for this omission cannot be stated better
than is done in the report on article 63 of the Declaration of London,
.Prepared by M. Renault :
If the vessel is stopped, and it is shown that it was only in order to escape·
the inconvenience of being searched that recourse was had to flight, and that
beyond this she had done nothing contrary to neutrality, she will not be pun-ished for her attempt at flight. If, on the other hand, it is established that
the vessel has contraband on board, or that she has in some way or otherfailed to comply with her duty as a neutral, she will suffer the consequences
of her infraction of neutrality, but in this case, as in the last, she will not
undergo any punishment for her attempt at flight. Expression was given to
the contrary view, namely, that a ship should be punished for an obviousattempt at flight as much as for forcible resistance. It was suggested that
the prospect of having the escaping vessel condemned as good prize would
influence the captain of the cruiser to do his best to spare her. But in theend this view did not prevail.

(b) The second ground for capture is that of the failure of a
neutral aircraft to comply with directions given by a belligerent
commanding officer enjoining the withdrawal of neutral aircraft
from the immediate vicinity of his military operations. By the·
terms of article 30, a neutral aircraft disregarding such a prohibition is exposed to the risk of being fired upon. It 1night well bethought that such risk would involve a sufficient deterrent without
rendering non-compliance a ground of capture. The reason why
capture has been added is due to the peculiar circumstances of warfare in the air. The right to oblige aircraft to avoid the scene of'
military operations would only be made use of in cases where it
vvas a matter of importance to the belligerent to ensure their absence, and consequently where effective measures must be taken tosecure compliance. If a neutral private aircraft is to be fired -upon
for this purpose, it is desirable to render it as little likely as possiblethat it shall be fired upon in a way that will involve its destruction.
If the airman knows that the aircraft, when forced to alight, may
be m3,de the subject of capture, he is less tempted to secure observance of the rule by firing in a way which will involve the destruction of the aircraft.
(c) The third ground for capture is where the aircraft is engaged in unneutral service. This phrase " unneutral service " formed
the subject of careful consideration in the Naval Conference of
London in 1908 and 1909, at the time when the Declaration of
I~ondon was framed. The meaning attached to the term by theCommission in the preparation of the present text is that used in
articles 45 and 46 of that Declaration, the intention being to render
t.hose articles applicable in the case of siinilar action on the part
of aircraft. For instance, it will cover an act amounting to taking
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a direct part in hostilities, such as that mentioned in the second
paragraph of article 16. The Commission would also refer to that
portion of the Report on the Declaration of London which deals
with unneutral service (articles 45 . and 46) as they are in entire
concurrence with it.
(d) The fourth ground for capture is that a neutral private air·craft is armed in violation of article 16, which stipulates that outside its ovvn jurisdiction a private aircraft must not be armed. The
carriage of arms by a private aircraft under such circumstances
gives rise to a well-founded suspicion of an intention to take part
]n hostilities in violation of the laws of war.
(e) The fifth ground for capture ·is that an aircraft has no marks
or is bearing false marks in violation of article 19.
(f) The sixth g~ound for capture is the absence or irregularity
·of the papers of the aircraft. This rule is in accordance with that
which prevails in maritime warfare. The papers which must be
·carried are indicated with greater precision in article 54.
(g) The seventh ground for capture is that of an aircraft being
found manifestly out of the proper line of its flight as indicated
by its papers and where no sufficient reason is found :for its pres·ence in that locality. The importance o:f this rule from the point
o:f view of aerial warfare is due to the ease with which aircraft can
be used for reconnaisance work, even though they may be masquerading as neutral aircraft engaged on innocent occupations. It may
-well be that in any particular case the aircraft will be able to estab1ish the innocence of its presence. It may have been blown out o:f
·:its course; it may have been compelled to make a deviation to secure
·supplies; it may even have intentionally deviated :for the purpose
,o:f avoiding an area in which it considered that military ope~ations
\Vere possible. It is therefore to the interests of both parties-the
belligerent and the neutral-that ample opportunity :for enquiry
should be given to the belligerent before exercising his right of
·capture. It will only be where the results of such investigations show
-that there is good cause for suspicion that the aircraft was engaged
in some improper operations that capture will be resorted to.
(h) The eighth ground for capture is where the neutral private
~aircraft carries, or itself constitutes, contraband of war. This subhead is framed upon the basis that the term "contraband of \var .,,
·will bear the same 1neaning as it has in mari tim.e warfare.
( i) The ninth ground for capture is that the aircraft is engaged
:in a breach of blockade. "Blockade " is here used in the same sense
:in vvhich it is employed in Chapter 1 of the Declaration of London,
that is to say, an operati_on of war for the purpose of preventing by
the use of warships ingress or egress of commerce to or from a defined portion of the enemy's coast. It has no reference to a blockade
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enforced ,vithou.t the use of warships, nor does it cover military investments of particular localities on land. These operations, which
may be termed "aerial blockade," were the subject of special examination by the experts attached to the various Delegations, who·
framed a special report on the subject for consideration by the Full
Commission. The conditions ·contemplated in this sub-head are
those of warships enforcing a blockade at sea 'vith aircraft acting in
co-operation with them. As the pri1nary elements of the blockade·
will, therefore, be maritime, the recognised principles applicable to
such blockade, as for instance, that it must be effective (Declaration
o£ Paris, article 4), and that it must be duly notified and its precise
limits fixed, will also apply. This is intended to be shown by the
use of the words "breach of blockade duly established and effectively maintained". in the text of the sub: head.
It is too early yet to indicate with precision the extent to which
the co-operation of aircraft in the maintenance of blockade at sea
may be possible; experience alone can sho,v. Nevertheless, it is
necessary to indicate the sense in which the Commission has used
the word "effective." As pointed out in the Declaration of London,
the effectiveness of a blockade is a question o£ fact. ~ The word
"effective" is intended to ensure that it must be maintained by a
force sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy coast-line. The
prize court may, for instance, have to consider what proportion of
surface vessels can escape the watchfulness of the blockading squad-·
rons without endangering the effectiveness of the blockade; this
is a question which the prize court alone can determine. In the
same way, this question may have to be considered where aircraft are
co-operating in the maintenance of a blockade.
The invention of the aircraft cannot impose upon a belligerent
who desires to in.stitute a blockade the obligation to employ aircraft.
in co-operation with his naval forces. If he does not do so, the
effectiveness of the blockade would not b2 affected by failure to stop
aircraft passing through. It is only where the belligerent endeavoursto render his blockade effective in the air-space above the sea as well
as on the surface itself that captures of aircraft will be made and that
any question of th2 effectiveness of the blockade in the air could
arise.
The facility with 'vhich an aircraft, desirous of entering the -blockaded area, could evade the blockade by passing outside the geographical limits of the blockade has not escaped the attention of the
Commission. This practical question n1ay affect the extent to 'vhich '
belligerents will resort to blockade in future, but it does not affect (
the fact that where a blockade has been established and an aircraft (
attempts
to pass,,-.c .through
into
tb-~ blockaded area within the li1nits \
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'The Netherlands Delegation proposed to suppress (i) on the
grounds that air blockade could not be effectively maintained, basing its opinion on its int2rpretation o£ the experts' report on the
s ubject.
The British, French, Italian and Japanese Delegations voted for
its maintenance. The American J?elegation voted for its Inaintenance ad referendum.
(k) The tenth ground for capture is that the private aircraft has
'
been transferred from belligerent to neutral nationality with a view
to escaping the disadvantages which enemy status confers upon aircraft. This sub-head has been inserted in order that so far as possible the rules applicable to maritime warfare should apply to · warfare in the air.
The sub-head as adopted does not embody the detailed provisions
o £ the Declaration o£ London (articles 55 and 56) because those a rticles constituted a compromise between two competing principles
a nd have not stood the test o£ experience.
The sub-heads enumerated above comprise those which the Colnmis.sion has considered sufficient to justify capture. Experience may ~
show that other cases ·will arise in which capture may be necessar..y,
as great development may yet occur in the science o£ aviation.
The article concludes with a proviso that the act which constitutes
the ground o£ capture must have occurred in the course of the flight
in which the neutral aircraft came into belligerent hands. This
proviso would not, o£ course, apply to the case o£ transfer from bellig~rent to neutral nationality.
Account must also be taken o£ the special case provided £or in
article 6 o£ the rules for the control o£ radio in time o£ war under
-vvhich :merchant vessels or aircraft transmitting intelligence may in
eertain circumstances be liable to capture for a period o£ one year
from the commission o£ the act complained o£.
ARTICLE

53

A neutral private aircraft is liable to capture if it_!_
(a) Resists the legitimate exercise of belligerent rights.
(b) . Violates a prohibition of which it has had notice issued by a beb
ligerent commanding officer under article 10.
(c) Is engaged in unneutral service.
(d) Is armed in time of war when outside the jurisdiction of its own
country.
(e) Has no external marks or uses false marks.
(f) Has no papers or insufficient or irregular papers.
(g) Is manifestly out of the line between the point of departure and the
point of destination indicated in its papers and after such enquiries
as the belligerent may deem necessary, no good cause is shown for
the deviation. The aircraft, together with its crew and pas-
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"Senger s, if any, may be detained by t h e belligerent, pending such
enquiries.
rCh) Carries, or itself constitutes, contraband of war.
''( i) Is engaged in brea·c h of a blockade duly establish ed and effectively
maintained.
·.( k) Has been transferred from belligerent to neutral n a t ion a lity at a
date and in circumstances indicating an int ent ion of evading the
consequences to which an enemy aircraft, a s such, i s exposed.
-P rovided that in each case (except ( k) ) the gr ound for ca pture sh all be an
·act carried out in the flight in which the neutral aircraft came into belligerent
hands, i. e., since it left its point of departure a nd befo re it r eached its point
of destinat\on.

By custom and tradition practical uniformity has arisen as to the
papers which a merchant vessel is expected to carry. There is no
:serio-q,s divergence between the legislation now, in force in civilised
countries. No practical inconvenience, therefore, arises in the appli~c_at.ion ..of the ,establ~shed rule of maritime \var, that a vessel is liable
t o capture i£ it has no papers or if the papers are irregular. Similar
:uniformity would no doubt in time arise in connection \vith aircraft,
particularly if the Air Navigation CoJ).vention of 1919 becomes
universal. It has, however, been thought prudent to indicate in a
~special article the facts which the papers found on board an aircraft
must indi~ate if its papers are to be held sufficient. Under article 6
the papers to be borne by an aircraft are those prescribed by the laws
l()f its own State. The forms, names and number of such papers are
t herefore a matter to be determined by each State except so far as it
may already be bound by treaty stipulations. Article 54 prescribes ~he points that must be established by such papers, that is to say, it
en~ures that the papers shall give the belligerent information on the
points which it is important for him to know. They must show the
nationality of the aircraft, the names and nationality of the crew
a.nd the passengers, the points of departure and destination of the
flight, particulars of the cargo, and must include the necessary logs.
'The legislation in force in each State must be sufficient to satisfy
this rule if it desires that its aircraft shall escape trouble in time of
war. It is not thought that this article will involve any inconvenience, as legislation \vhich \vould not prescribe at least as much
-as the above on the subject of aircraft is unlikely to be enacted by any
State.
ARTICLE

54

The papers of a private aircraft will be regarded as insufficient or irregular
if they do not establish the nationality of the aircraft and indicate the names
.and nationality of the crew and passengers, the points of departure and destination of the flight, together with particulars of the cargo and the conditions
under which it is transported. The logs must also be included.
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The practice has no\v become universal for belligerent States to
institute a prize court in which proceedings will take place for adjudicating on all cases of capture of ships or goods effected in maritime
\Yar. It is in the interest of neutrals that this system has been
developed. If aircraft are to be allowed to exercise the- belligerent
right of capture, it is only proper that the same protection should be
accorded to neutrals as in the case of captures effected by warships.
'This view has readily obtained unanimous assent, and is embodied
in article 55.
ARTICLE

55

Capture of an aircraft or of goods on board an aircraft shall be made the
subject of prize proceedings, in order that any neutral claim may be dul:y heard
and determined.

The provisions of articles 52 and 53 deal only with the grounds
for capture. They do not prescribe the rule which is to be applied
by the prize court. Reflection has led the Commission to the view
that, save in certain exceptional cases where aircraft ·will have been
ca pturecl for reasons peculiar to aerial warfare, the decisions of the·
prize courts in adjudicating on captures effected by aircraft, should
proceed on the same principles as those which obtain in captures by
\Yarships. If the jurisdiction of the prize courts is to apply in aerial
\Varfare as ·well as in maritime warfare, it is convenient that the rules.
applied should be the same in both cases. It would be impossible to,
frame an exact code, at the present stage, of the rules which prize
courts apply, nor indeed would it be within the competence of this.
Co1nmission to do so as far as concerns maritime warfare. It would
certainly lead to divergence between rules applied in the case of
aerial captures and those ' applied in the case of maritime captures ..
The simplest solution has therefore been found in the adoption of the
principle that the prize court should apply the same rules in both
cases.
The special cases ·which have to be provided for are those where·
an aircraft has no marks or has used false marks, or has been found
armed in time of ·war outside the jurisdiction of its ow:q. country, and
also in the case where a neutral aircraft has violated the rule that it
must not infringe the directions of the belligerent commanding
officer to keep a vvay from the imm~diate vicinity of his military
operations. In these cases it is agreed that the aircraft should be
liable to condemnation.
ARTICLE

56

A private aircraft captured upon the ground that it has no external marks:
or is using false marks, or that it is armed in time of war outside the jurisdiction of its own country, is liable to condemnation.
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A neutral private aircraft captured upon the ground that it has disregarded
:the direction of a belligerent commanding officer under article 30 is liable to
·condemnation, unless it can justify its presence within the prohibited zone.
In all other cases, the prize court in adjudicating upon any case of capture
.of an aircraft or its cargo, or of postal correspondence on board an aircraft,
:shall apply the same rules as would be applied to a merchant vessel or its cargo
·.or to postal correspondence on board a merchant vessel.

The destruction of neutral merchant vessels first came into promi.n ence as a belligerent practice at the time of the Russo-Japanese
\Var. It was not without difficulty that an agreement was reached
between the Powers as to the extent to which the practice should be
recognised in maritime war. In the case of enemy vessels, the
practice has .always been recognised as legitimate, subject t~ the over- ·
riding principle that the persons on board must be placed in safety
:and the papers of the vessel must be secured. This principle has
been adapted to aerial warfare by article 57, of which the text is as
follows ::
ARTlCLE

57

Private aircraft which are found upon visit and search to be enemy aircraft
may be destroyed if the belligerent commanding officer finds it necessary to do
~so, provided that all persons on board have first been placed in safety and all
rthe papers of the aircraft have been preserved.

The articles dealing with the destruction of neutral aircraft are
1argely based upon the provisions of the Declaration of London, but
1the language used is of a more restrictive character, so as to reduce
the possibilities of an abuse of the practice, as happened in the late
·w ar. Destruction is limited to cases ·where an aircraft is captured in
~ircumstances which show that it would be liable to condemnation on
the ground of unneutral service, or on the ground that it has no
1marks or bears false marks. Apart from these cases, destruction can
(only be justified by the existence of grave military emergencies
which would not justify the officer in command in releasing the air·craft. In all cases, destruction must be justified by the circumstance
that sending the aircraft in for adjudication would be impossible, or
·would imperil the safety of the belligerent aircraft or the success of
the operations in which it is engaged.
ARTICLE

58

Private .aircraft which are found upon visit and search to be neutral aircraft
'liable to condemnation upon the ground of unneutral service, or upon the
:ground that they have no external marks or are bearing false marks, may be
·destroyed, if sending them in for adjudication would be impossible or would
imperil the safety of the belligerent aircraft or the success of the operations in
which it is ·engaged. Apart from the cases mentioned above, a neutral private
aircraft must not be destroyed except in the gravest military emergency, which
would not justify the officer in command in releasing it or sending it in for
:adjudication.
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The safeguards designed to ensure full protection for neutraF
interests in the case of any such destruction are embodied -in article
59. The persons on board must be placed in safety. The papers
must be secured in order that they may be available in the forthcoming prize court proceedings. The captor must then bring the case·
before the prize court and must establish, firstly, the need for destruction, and, secondly, when that is established, the validity of the·
capture. Failure to establish the first point will expose him to the'
risk of paying compensation to all the parties interested in the aircraft and its cargo. Failure to establish the second will place him in
the same position in ·which he would be if the aircraft had not been
destroyed, and he had been ordered to make restitution of the aircraft or cargo improperly captured.
ARTICLE

59

Before a neutral private aircraft is destroyed, all persons on board must beplaced in safety, and all the papers of the aircraft must be preserved.
A captor who has destroyed a neutral private aircraft must bring the capture before the prize court, and must first establish that he was justified in destroying it under article 58. If he fails to do this, parties interested in the aircraft or its cargo are entitled to compen~ation. If the capture is held to be invalid, though the act of destruction is held to have been justifiable, compensation must be paid to the parties interested in place of the restitution to \Vhich
they would have been entitled.

The special case o£ the destruction of contraband on board an
aircraft, a part :from the destruction of 'the aircraft itself, is dealt
with in article 60, which proceeds on lines similar to article 54 of the
Declaration of London. After the contraband has been destroyed,.
the aircraft will be allowed to continue its flight. Similar provision
is made for the protection of neutral interests as under the preceding·
articles.
The article as adopted is limited to absolute contraband, but three·
Delegations considered that the word " absolute" should be deleted,.
and that the article should extend to all forms of contraband, as in
article 54 of the Declaration of London.
ARTICLE

60

\Vhere a neutral private aircraft is captured on the ground that it is carrying
contraband, the capter may demand the surrender of any _absolute contraband
on board, or may proceed to the destruction of such absolute contraband, if
sending in the aircraft for adjudication is impossible or would imperil the
safety of the belligerent aircraft or the success of the operations in which it is
engaged. After entering i.n the log book of the aircraft the delivery or destruction of the goods, and securing, in original or copy, the relevant papers of the
aircraft, the captor must allow the neutral aircraft to continue its flight.
The provisions of the second paragraph of Article 59 will apply where absolute contraband on uoard a neutral private aircraft is handed over or destroyed.
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C'HAPTER VIII. DEFINITIONS
In some countries, the w·ord "military" is not generally employed
in a sense which includes." naval." To remove any ambiguity on
this point a special article has been adopted.
ARTICLE

61

The term "military" throughout these rules is to be read as referring to all
branches of the forces, i. e., the land forces, the naval forces and the air·
forces.

Article 62 is intended to remove all risk of doubt as to whether
aircraft personnel should, in matters not covered by these rules or·
by conventions as to the application of which there can be no doubt,
be governed by the Land Warfare Regulations or by the unwritten
rules governing maritime ·war. The rules to be applied are thosecontained in the Land Warfare Regulations. R~gard must be had·
to the last. paragraphs of the Convention to ·which the Land Warfare·
Regulations are attached, that cases not provided for are not in-tended, for want of a written ·prohibition, to be left to the arbitrary
judgment of military commanders. In all such ca~es the population
and belligerents are to remain under the protection of the rule of the~
principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established between civilised nations, from the laws of humanity and the·
requirements of the public conscience.
The French Delegation expressed ·the opinion that the terms of"
article 62 were hardly adequate to cover a subject so complex.
ARTICLE

62

Except so far as special rules are here laid down and except also so far as.
the provisions of Chapter VII of these Rules or international conventions indi-cate that maritime law and procedure are applicable, aircraft personnel engaged in hostilities come under the laws of war and neutrality applicable toland troops in virtue of the custom and practice of international law and of the
various declarations and conventions to which the States concerned are parties.

JURISDICTION
The British draft code contained an article (No. 9) stipulating·
that for the purpose of the proposed rules, territory over which a
Power exercises a protectorate or a mandate, and also protected
States, should be assimilated to the national territory of that Power.
The Japanese Delegation drew atten~ion to the necessity of providing·
also for the case of leased terr~tories if any such article were adopted.
Throughout the articles adopted the word "jurisdiction " is used.
The Commission has considered the question whether it is necessaryto add a definition of the word "jurisdiction," and has come to the·
conclusion that it would be better not to do so. The area within
which each State is responsible is well understood; no difficulty of
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this sort arises in practice; and no inconvenience has been caused
by the absence of any such definition from Convention No. XIII, o:f
1907, in which the word "jurisdiction " is used in a manner very
:similar to that in which it is used in the present rules.
MARGINAL TERRITORIAL AIR BELT

An interesting proposal was made by the Italian Delegation that
.along the coast of every State the national jurisdiction in the airspace should for aerial purposes extend to 10 miles. The proposal
. did not comprise any extension of territorial waters generally, a
matter which would have been outside the reference to the Commission under the terms of the Washington Resolution.
Detailed consideration o:f the proposal led the majority of the
delegations to think that the suggestion is not practicable.
It seems inevitable that great confusion would follow from any
rule ·which laid down a different ·width for the territorial airspace
from that recognised for territorial waters, more particularly in the
case of neutral countries for whose benefit and protection the proposal is put forward. As an example it is only necessary to take
article 42, which obliges a neutral State to endeavour to compel a
belligerent military aircraft entering its jurisdiction to alight. If
the aircraft entered the jurisdiction from over the high seas, it would
do so at 10 miles from the coast, and if in compliance with neutral
orders it forthwith alighted on the water, it would then be outside
the neutral jurisdiction, and the neutral State could not intern the
.aircraft.
On principle it would seem that the jurisdiction in the airspace
should be appurtenant to the territorial jurisdiction enjoyed beneath
it, and that in the absence of a territorial jurisdiction beneath, there
is no sound basis for jurisdiction in the air.
Furthermore, it is felt that the obligation to enforce respect for
:neutral rights throughout a 10-mile belt would impose an increased
burden on neutral Powers without adequate compensating advantages. Even with this wider belt it would still be easy for airmen
fighting in the air to lose their bearings in the heat of the combat,
and to encroach inadvertently on neutral jurisdiction. Lastly, the
greater the distance from the coast, the n1ore difficult it is for the
position of an aircraft to be determined with precision, and the more
frequent, therefore, will disputes become between belligerent and
neutral States as to violation by the former's aircraft of the latter's
jurisdiction.
With a vie·w to meeting these criticisms, the Italian Delegation
recast the proposal in a different shape, and suggested that in time of
war a State, whether neutral or belligerent, should be authorized,
i f it so desired, and if it notified other Powers accordingly at the
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beginning of the \var, to extend its jurisdiction over the marginal airbelt to a distance of 10 miles at any given places along its coast. In
this form the proposal \Vould have placed no burden upon neutrals,
b'ecause they \vould not have made use of it unless they considered
it to their advantage. The anomalies of the divergent widths of the
marginal air-belt and the marginal belt of sea ·would have remained.
After due consideration of the proposal, the majority of the Delegations felt unable to accept the proposal even in its amended :£orin.
The Italian Delegation made the following statement:
1. It does not think it desirable to resume in Plenary Commission the discussion of a question which has on several occasions been considered in all the
necessary detail during the meetings of the Sub-Committee.
2. Nevertheless, although the majority of the Delegations have already put
forward views opposed to its proposal, it continues to believe in the importance
of that proposal and in the necessity for its adoption and insertion in an
international convention.
3. From the point of view .both of belligerent and of neutral States, there are
reasons of the highest juridical and technical importance which make it indispensable to allow each State the power of including in its jurisdiction the
atmospheric space to a distance of 10 miles from its coast.
4. The difficulties resulting from the difference between the width of the
marginal air-belt and the width of national territorial waters would not seem
to be so serious as to render the Italian proposal unacceptable in practice.
5. In any case, there is no juridical obstacle to the fixing of the same width
of space for the marginal air-belt as for territorial waters, the Italian Delegation being of opinion that international law, as generally recognised, contains
no rule prohibiting a State from extending its territorial waters to a distance
of 10 sea-miles from its coasts.
6. In conclusion, it urges that a question of such paramount importance
should be reopened and placed upon the agenda of a conference in the near
future.
COMPENSATION AND DISPUTES

The Netherlands Delegation submitted the following proposal:
The belligerent Party who, intentionally, or through negligence, violates the
provisions of the present rules is liable to pay compensation in case damage
is caused as a result of such violation. Such Party will be responsible for all
acts committed by members of his armed forces.
If any dispute should arise on the subject which is not otherwise settled,
such dispute shall be submitted for settlement to the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, in conformity with Convention I of 1907, or to the Permanent
Court of International Justice, in respect of such States as have accepted as
compulsory ipso facto its jurisdiction.
·

The Commission approving the principle of indemnity, decided
to incorporate the proposal in its general report, so as to bring it to
the attention of the Governments.
VIOLATION OF THE RULES

No provision is made in the articles adopted as to the penalties
to which persons violating the rules are to be subject. Some of the
57920-26-11
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provisions in the drafts laid before the Commission .stated that per~
sons violating the article in question were to be punishable with
death, or were to be treated as war criminals. No such stipulation
figures in the Land Warfare Regulations and it has seemed better to
o1nit it. Its absence will not in any way prejudice the imposition of
puni.shment on persons who are guilty of breaches of the laws of
aerial warfare.
United States of America:
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THE HAGUE, February 19, 19B3.
CONVENTION BETWEEN NORWAY AND SWEDEN RELATING TO
AIR NAVIGATION, SIGNED AT STOCKHOLM, MAY 26, 1923 25

His Majesty the I{ing of Sweden and His Majesty the King of
Norway, who have agreed to conclude a Convention relating to Air .
Navigation between Sweden and Norway, have for this purpose ap~
pointed as their plenipotentiaries:
l-Iis Majesty the King of Sweden:
His Excellency Carl Fredrik Wilhelm Hederstierna, His
Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs;
His Majesty the l{ing of Norway:
M. Johan Herman Wollebaek, His 1'Iajesty's Envoye Extraor~
dinary at Stockholm;
who, having duly received full powers, have agreed as follows:
25
1923 League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. XVIII, p. 173. While the "Rules or
Aerial Warfare" drawn up by the Commission of Jurists in 1023 have not been ratified
conventions somewhat similar to that of l\fay 26, 1923, between Norway and Sweden hav~
been ratified by several states since the World War.

